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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
1. On 28 February 2008 the Government/Party of National Unity (PNU) and the Orange 
Democratic Party (ODM), under the Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation 
(KNDR) signed an agreement to end the political violence that followed the disputed 
2007 December general elections. Through the mediation by the African Union’s (AU) 
Panel of Eminent African Personalities under the chairmanship of Mr Kofi Annan, the 
parties signed the KNDR agreement and formed a Coalition government. 
2. South Consulting has been monitoring implementation of the KNDR agreements from 
2008. This is the third review report for the year 2010. Previous reports covering the 
period between December 2008 and July 2010 can be found at www.dialoguekenya.org.  
3. This report covers the July to September 2010 period. The report focuses on two issues 
that have gained prominence and attention during this period: the International 
Criminal Court investigation of the Kenya situation; and the implementation of the new 
Constitution, passed at the referendum held on 4 August 2010 and promulgated on 27 
August 2010.   
4. The report has predominantly utilized qualitative data. The research team carried out 
interviews in various regions affected by the 2007 post-election violence. Key informants 
were drawn from government ministries, humanitarian organisations, civil society 
organisations, the media and members of the public.  Secondary sources have also been 
reviewed for additional information.  
FINDINGS  
The ICC and the post-election violence 
5. The findings show that there is no common position among the main parties on the issue 
of the ICC intervention; indeed there are senior leaders who would prefer to terminate or 
delay it. Divisions in the Grand Coalition have created an opportunity for impunity to re-
organise and undermine progressive reforms and interventions aimed at ending 
impunity. Impunity is re-organising through mobilisation of ethnic constituencies for 
support against or in favour of the ICC intervention. Significant also is that there is an 
absence of leadership and ownership of the ICC intervention as a means of ending 
impunity: there is no local political ownership of this issue given its potential to 
terminate political careers.  
6. This notwithstanding, the intervention of the ICC is important in one respect. It will 
impact on Kenya’s political culture of tolerating and celebrating impunity especially 
when senior and influential politicians are involved. The main challenge, however, is 
that in spite of the post-election violence, and about two years to the next general 
election, Kenya’s political culture has not changed. There are very clear signs that it is 
‘business-as-usual’. Some senior leaders show little genuine commitment to the ICC 
investigation of the Kenya situation or are seeking to politicise it to promote personal 
political interests. While this is happening, leaders appear to pay scant attention to the 
problem of IDPs many of who have remained without secure livelihood for more than 
two years.  
7. All communities should contend with the possibility that one of “their own” could be 
indicted and tried for the post-election violence. They should understand that the ICC is 
not targeting a community. And all communities should recognise that communities as a 
group do not commit crimes. Nor do they pay criminals to perpetrate violence. Individual 
politicians and other influential people pay for the perpetration of violence. And because 
they have never been put on trial, impunity has continued to triumph and to threaten the 
life of the very communities they claim to represent. The ICC is an avenue for justice for 
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many people who suffered during the post-election violence.  
8. Lower and middle level perpetrators should be prosecuted – attention should focus on 
them too: Although the ICC will prosecute those who bear the greatest responsibility, and 
probably politically and economically influential people, it is the duty of the government 
and the society in general to ensure that lower and middle level perpetrators do not get 
away with impunity. The criminal who destroyed property, raped, killed or injured other 
people are yet to be arrested and successfully prosecuted. The fact that the ICC will target 
only senior politicians may perpetuate impunity amongst lower level perpetrators who 
carried out actual attacks because they may believe there is no mechanism to hold them 
accountable. Moreover, there is little media and public attention on them at present. 
9. This development suggests a need for the government as a whole to commit itself to 
cooperate with the ICC as it is obliged to do under the Rome Statute. The government has 
stated its commitment to this obligation but some within government, including senior 
and influential people, may be subject to investigation. It is the allies of such people that 
could be pushing for an ethnic agenda by insisting that the ICC is targeting certain ethnic 
communities. To ensure victims get justice and in the spirit of cooperation with the ICC, 
the government must allow such people to be tried if the ICC indicted them. Politicising 
the ICC intervention is of little effect. It does not give justice to the victims. Only the Pre-
Trial Chamber (PTC) can stop the ICC from investigating the Kenyan situation. The Pre-
Trial Chamber can decide to terminate the case or send the prosecutor back to find more 
evidence. Kenyan politicians cannot stop the process.   
10. The National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC) has filled an important gap 
in the understanding and countering some of the factors that cause violence during 
elections. The Commission successfully stigmatised hate speech during the referendum 
by ensuring arrest of senior politicians and monitoring speeches during the campaigns. 
These measures should provide lessons to guide approaches to prevent violence in the 
future. It is important that the Commission does not relent on monitoring speeches by 
senior politicians after the referendum; monitoring hate speech should be continuous.  
Implementation of the new Constitution 
11. The passing of a new Constitution in a peaceful referendum marks a major turning 
point in Kenya’s history. The new constitution is of monumental historical significance 
to Kenya and even to Africa in general. It is commendable that a process that had taken 
decades without completion was finalised within a period of about two years from the 
time the Committee of Experts was appointed. The new Constitution enjoys wide popular 
support and legitimacy. The voter turnout itself was unprecedented; at 72 percent, the 
referendum turnout is the highest in Kenya’s multi-party electoral history. And at a 67 
percent approval rating, the legitimacy of the new constitution is uncontestable. This is 
also significant in indicating renewed confidence in the ballot after the post-election 
violence.  
12. The new Constitution has given Kenyans a sense of optimism and opened opportunities 
for far-reaching reforms. It has rightly raised public hopes for the emergence of a new 
culture of governance. However, the process of delivering it demonstrated certain 
challenges. Some of these result from the factors that shape regional and constituency 
voting patterns. Other challenges stem from areas that were not satisfactorily  addressed 
during the negotiations among the political elites. These areas will become an arena 
where more politics will be played out. 
13. The endorsement and promulgation of the new Constitution should not mask the fact 
that it faced considerable opposition from some key groups and influential actors in the 
Kenyan society. One should also not gloss over the fact that there were many ‘water 
melons’ or influential leaders on the “Yes” side who did not welcome the new 
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Constitution but nonetheless pretended to be endorsing it. The support of others was 
secured through political coercion. These remain and may cause setbacks throughout the 
implementation process.  
14. Some of those who voted No feared local domination in the new Counties. They wanted 
their own Counties. This is an issue the implementation process must acknowledge and 
recognise as central to implementation. To assuage the fears of the numerically small 
groups in the Counties, legislations on County governments must underline the principle 
of ‘inclusive government’ and ensure that all groups are adequately represented. The laws 
governing their operations must also seek to protect the minorities. Article 10 on 
‘National Values and Principles of Governance’ as well as Chapter Six on Leadership and 
Integrity should be established as the corner posts for the County governments.  
15. Civic education, on both demand and supply side of the new Constitution -  should be 
intensified: The referendum campaigns did not provide adequate opportunity for civic 
education. There is need to carry out civic education on the provisions of the new 
constitution and how the implementation is to be rolled out in order to manage 
expectations. Civil society should focus attention the demand side by creating awareness 
on the type of demands citizens should make in line with the constitution. On the other 
hand, the government should focus attention on improving people’s knowledge on what 
the government can supply or the type of services or facilitation the government should 
supply. Civic education on the new Constitution should be institutionalised including by 
embedding the constitution or the values and principles of the new Constitution in the 
school curriculum. 
Conclusions 
16. The new Constitution has set up a new framework; it aims at creating a new Kenya 
complete with new institutions and new values. Rights and freedoms are the cornerstone 
of this new Kenya. It is demolishing old institutions that were based on colonial rule. The 
new institutions are also better shielded against political patronage. There is a new sense 
of optimism and hope – the constitution has created opportunities for recovery. 
17. The challenges facing the birth of a new Kenya, however, are many. The new society is yet 
to show; there are signs that old habits have not died. Firstly, the political culture is yet to 
change; the culture of bad governance is deeply embedded in all institutions and sectors 
but there is no debate on how to end it. The trend is to promote self-interest rather than 
the public good. Secondly, there is no public dialogue on what this new society is about 
and how it should be achieved. Thirdly there is resistance to change by those who stand 
to lose from change. They opposed the constitution because of self-interest rather than 
ideological position. Some will continue opposing the constitution and resisting it as long 
as it threatens the status quo and their chances to benefit from bad governance. Fourthly, 
expectations are high. Some are unrealistic and yet they must be addressed. The public 
will be disillusioned once they see the culture of ‘business-as-usual’ slipping back in. 
18. There are several ways to mitigate some of these challenges. One, Policies and 
legislations around the new constitution must draw from extensive consultations. They 
must borrow from discourses around the envisaged ‘new Kenya’. The legislations must 
set high standards; the benchmarks must be so high that even those wishing to bring the 
standards down will find it difficult to do so. Two, policy dialogue or debates must begin. 
And this is not the work of the government alone. This is the responsibility of all actors 
and in particular civil society, the private sector and the media. The hard task has begun 
and people must make decisions from an informed point of view. Three, religious 
intolerance witnessed during the referendum must be addressed. The divisions witnessed 
during the period are now an additional cleavage to a society already divided along ethnic 
and income lines. These can be addressed only by promoting a clear understanding of the 
principles around which the constitution is built: the principles of an open society.  
vii  
                             
19. Institutional and electoral reforms must be undertaken and completed with urgency. 
Another election is due in about two years from now. The high number of rejected votes 
(spoilt votes) in the referendum is clear evidence of the need to undertake comprehensive 
voter education.  The Interim Independent Electoral Commission must also contend with 
the fact that the investment required to have a free and fair election in the next general 
election is huge.  Establishing the electoral body in line with the requirements of the new 
constitution must begin in earnest to be ready for these reforms.  Electoral rules must be 
known early, accepted early, and institutionalised before the next general election. 
Similarly, institutional reforms and in particular the police and judicial reforms must be 
completed with urgency in preparation of the next general election. The reforms 
themselves must demonstrate that there is a new culture of doing things – one of 
accountability to the public. 
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1. INTRODUCTION    
 
1. On 28 February 2008 following the political violence that engulfed Kenya after the 
disputed December 2007 General Election, the two main parties – the Party of 
National Unity (PNU) and the Orange Democratic Party (ODM) – signed an agreement 
to undertake several step to end the crisis. Through mediation by the African Union’s 
(AU) Panel of Eminent African Personalities under the chairmanship of Mr Kofi 
Annan, the parties committed to undertake actions under four main agenda items 
agreed at the Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation (KNDR) process. These 
were: 
a. Agenda Item 1: Immediate action to stop violence and restore fundamental 
rights and liberties; 
b. Agenda Item 2: Immediate measures to address the humanitarian crisis, 
and promote healing and reconciliation; 
c. Agenda Item 3: How to overcome the political crisis; and 
d. Agenda Item 4: Addressing long-term issues, including constitutional and 
institutional reforms, land reforms, poverty and inequalities, youth 
unemployment, national cohesion, and transparency and accountability. 
2. South Consulting has been monitoring implementation of the KNDR agreements from 
2008. This is the third review report for year 2010. Previous reports covering the 
period between December 2008 and July 2010 can be found at 
www.dialoguekenya.org.  
3. This report covers the July to September 2010 period. The previous reports have 
tracked progress on implementation of each of the four agenda items 1-4. The July 
2010 report focused on the progress towards a new constitution. This report, however, 
examines two issues that are important at this point in time: the International Criminal 
Court investigation of the Kenya situation; and the implementation of the New 
Constitution, passed at 4 August 2010 referendum.   
4. The report has mainly utilized qualitative data. The research team interviewed various 
respondents in different regions affected by the 2007 post-election violence. Key 
informants were drawn from government ministries, humanitarian organisations, civil 
society organisations, the media and members of the public at large. Secondary sources 
have also been reviewed for additional information.  
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2. THE POST-ELECTION VIOLENCE, THE ICC AND IMPLICATION FOR 
PEACE AND SECURITY  
 
 
Introduction 
5. The KNDR agreements underlined the need for peace and security for all Kenyans. A 
Commission of Inquiry into the Post-Election Violence (CIPEV) was established and 
recommended the setting up of a Special Tribunal for Kenya to investigate and try 
those responsible for various criminal acts during the crisis period. Following the 
subsequent failure of Parliament to pass a law establishing a Special Tribunal for 
Kenya, the matter was handed over to the International Criminal Court (ICC). In 
March 2010, the ICC’s Pre-Trial Chamber II approved investigations into the Kenya 
situation. In May 2010, investigators from the ICC arrived in Kenya. Reports of 
intimidation of potential witnesses escalated, resulting in the matching increase in the 
number of those seeking protection from human rights organisations.  
 
6. This section of the report looks at reactions to the ICC investigation of the Kenyan 
situation as well as its linkages to the IDPs who are still in camps for the displaced.   
 
Key Findings 
 
Summary of findings 
• A 4 per cent reduction in crime rate nationally and a 25 per cent increase in Nairobi  
• Organised Crimes Bill enacted and comes into force amid a resurgence in extra-
judicial killings  
• There is continuing public confidence in the ICC 
• New Constitution presents opportunity for fundamental reforms 
The ICC, the Grand Coalition, and the Kenya Situation 
7. The April-June report of 2010 noted that the ICC efforts and political anxiety over who 
might be on the list of suspected perpetrators of violence continued to weaken the 
Grand Coalition. From March 2010 when the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber II approved 
investigations into the Kenya situation, anxiety has continued to grow over who might 
be indicted. This anxiety and the possibility that senior and influential politicians could 
be the focus of these investigations have had several consequences. First, it has 
reinforced political realignments that began to emerge in 2009 when it became clear 
that the ICC would intervene in the Kenya situation. These realignments coalesced into 
political factions focused on safeguarding the interests of senior politicians who felt 
threatened by these developments.  
 
8. Secondly, the emergent and evolving political factions weakened the Grand Coalition 
Government because those central to these factions came from both parties in the 
Grand Coalition. Thirdly, factionalism prevented the establishment of a Special 
Tribunal for Kenya and effectively undermined political commitment to the 
prosecution of anyone involved in the post-election violence. Thus to date, there has 
been no successful prosecution of any incident related to the post-election violence. 
Almost all the cases prosecuted in the courts have failed to yield a conviction due to 
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poor investigations or lack of sufficient evidence to sustain prosecution.  Generally, 
ineptitude in the criminal justice system and lack of a coherent official position on 
whether or not to punish perpetrators has persuaded victims that local mechanisms are 
not likely to deliver justice for them.  
 
9. Divisions in the Grand Coalition Government continue to undermine political 
commitment to support the ICC. Parties in the Grand Coalition Government lack a 
coherent position on how to address the post-election violence and how to support the 
ICC investigation into the Kenya situation. Senior leaders continue to issue 
contradictory statements that stir controversy on whether to support the ICC or 
establish a local Special Tribunal – or have both – or even sometimes asking whether 
ICC should stop handling PEV cases altogether because there is a new constitution.2 
The general incoherence in the coalition reflects lack of leadership on the PEV cases 
and the ICC investigation of the Kenyan situation. It also demonstrates inadequate 
commitment and preparedness to address impunity for political violence.  
 
10. Impunity is fighting back: Combined, incoherence and lack of commitment have given 
impunity room to fight back. Senior politicians pronouncements on the ICC 
investigations suggest that it is now business-as-usual. Some leaders have been 
organising ethnic constituencies to promote positions that favour them. This on its own 
suggests that some senior leaders would prefer to terminate the investigation or even 
stop prosecution of post-election violence cases. Indeed, some human rights groups 
view recurrent overtures to terminate ICC’s involvement as the work of protectionist 
networks eager to safeguard their political interests by delaying or avoiding 
investigative processes.3  
 
11. The ICC investigation implications for the 2012 General Elections and its attendant 
power struggle: The work of the ICC is viewed as relevant to political strategies leading 
up to 2012. The perception has been gaining prominence that some leaders are seeking 
ways to leverage the ICC’s pursuit of justice, which may entail the indictment of 
political rivals.4 In particular, local discourses in the Rift Valley and Central provinces 
regarding the matter of ‘who bears the greatest responsibility’ regard the possible 
indictment of some leaders from the area as unjustified and motivated by the need to 
eliminate political rivals.  
 
12. Witness Protection Agency established and approves the protection of 20 witnesses.  
The prospect of prosecution by the ICC triggered the disappearance and intimidation of 
potential witnesses, giving rise to the need for an effective witness protection 
programme. In June 2010 the President assented to the Witness Protection 
(Amendment) Act, which paved the way for the establishment of an independent and 
autonomous Witness Protection Agency. A Witness Protection Advisory Board, chaired 
by the Attorney General was appointed amid concerns by the civil society that it is not 
neutral, considering state organs have been accused of perpetrating violations during 
the post-election violence. In June 2010 the Government signed commitments to 
                                                 
2 Barasa, L., ‘Mutula to Ocampo: Quit Kenya probe’ Sunday  Nation, 19 September, 2010 
3 Discussions at the forum of civil society and the implementation of the New Constitution, 23 Sept 2010 
4 Interview with a political analyst in Nairobi, 25 Aug 2010 
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protect all witnesses identified by the Chief Prosecutor5. In its first meeting in 
September 2010, the Witness Protection Advisory Board approved the protection of 20 
witnesses who have applied for cover, and the recruitment of directors and staff.  
 
13. In the meantime, about 70 witnesses are being protected by human rights NGOs within 
and outside the country.6 The ICC is protecting its own witnesses and does not depend 
on the Government or other witness protection programmes.7 Nonetheless, it has taken 
the Government inordinately long time to set up a credible witness protection unit. 
Because of this, some witnesses may have lost confidence and interest in witness 
protection. Some of those who left the country early, are allegedly losing interest in the 
prosecution citing fatigue and lack of commitment to address PEV cases.  
 
14. Allegations that witnesses have been compromised, coached or intimidated to tailor 
their testimony in a particular way presents a new threat to the quest for justice: Both 
victims and alleged perpetrators agreed that that the ICC needs to devise a way of 
carrying out its own investigations independently without relying on reports by other 
actors. Some argue that reports compiled by human rights NGOs and the Commission 
of Inquiry into the Post Election Violence (CIPEV/Waki Commission) relied on ‘filtered 
evidence’.8  There are allegations that some of the reports are not objective and that 
some individuals within some organisations released important and confidential data 
to alleged perpetrators to enable the latter prepare their defence or identify key 
witnesses for harassment and intimidation or even elimination. Some potential 
witnesses, within and outside the country, have allegedly been approached and may 
have been compromised.  
 
15. A narrative of victimhood is growing within two communities: The mutual distrust 
between ethnic communities in Rift Valley has given rise to allegations that witnesses 
from two large communities are being coached to reinforce a narrative of victimhood. 
This observation is in line with the previous findings that revealed that some politicians 
were allegedly reaching out to victim groups such as the Internally Displaced Persons 
(IDPs) to persuade them not to participate in the investigative processes. They were 
enticed with promises of land, money and scholarships.  
 
16. Competing claims about what happened is preventing healing and reconciliation: A 
disturbing finding is that communities are generating narratives for defence in the 
event of any prosecution. There is a template of narratives that has developed in the 
recent past. A respondent in Rift Valley, for instance, observed that the two 
communities that fought fiercest during the post election violence have their separate 
narratives; each with its version of the story.9 Still there are others who fear that truth 
will not come out because some people who are not victims have falsified claims to 
                                                 
5 Draft Report of the Inter-Ministerial Committee preparing for the first review conference of the Rome 
Statute held in Kampala between 31 May and 11 June 2010, dated 21 April 2010 
6 Interview with a human rights NGO working on witness protection issues, 12 Sept 2010; see also Daily 
Nation, Witness safety agency gets nod to hire’ 13 Sept 2010 
7 ‘400 Poll chaos victims apply to join Hague trials’ Daily Nation, 4 Sept 2010; also ‘Poll chaos witnesses flown 
out’ Daily Nation, 20 July 2010 
8 Interview with a government investigator, 20 September 2010 
9 Interviews in the Rift Valley, July and September 2010. 
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secure witness protection. ‘No truth will come out. I hear members of one community 
say they are not guilty because they were fighting on behalf of  and for somebody 
else. I hear the other side has also agreed on a common narrative. It is difficult to 
know if all these allegations are true because NGOs working with victims are not 
politically impartial and some are doing it for money. Ocampo should see through 
these layers of deception before drawing any conclusions.’10  
 
17. These new discourses have emerged because of the length of time it has take to begin 
investigations. No prosecutions have taken place. Failure to prosecute has given room 
for claims and counter claims about the violence and revising who the victims and 
perpetrators are. Competing claims and narratives may consolidate into competing 
‘truths’ and that may not only prevent people from not only learning from the past but 
also undermining healing and reconciliation. 
 
18. Public confidence in the ICC intervention remains high despite it making a slow start: 
The previous three review reports have shown that Kenyans overwhelmingly prefer the 
ICC to any local mechanism because they lack confidence in local judicial institutions. 
Confidence in the ICC has continued to remain high across the country before and after 
investigations into Kenya were approved. In June 2010, 52 per cent of respondents 
interviewed in the national survey were confident that the ICC would prosecute senior 
people who perpetrated the violence. In the survey, over 50 per cent of the respondents 
in Central, Eastern and the Coast provinces would support ICC trials. In Rift Valley, 
North Eastern and Western provinces, slightly more than 30 per cent would support 
the trial. Significantly, only a very small number, less than 5 per cent in all provinces, 
think that their people would violently attack members of other communities. Recent 
interviews on which this report is also based seem to corroborate these findings. In 
particular, concern that indictments by the ICC might trigger violence in the Rift Valley 
does not seem to align with local discourses.  
 
19. There will be no violence if ICC intervenes and indicts senior politicians from the 
involved communities. Several scenarios may be drawn regarding the ICC intervention.  
 
a. First there will be no violence at all, particularly if the indictment is seen to 
be sensitive to the country’s ethno-regional political dynamics and contests. 
According to some respondents, arrests will be deemed fair if senior 
politicians from other communities are also arrested, preferably 
simultaneously or within short order. If one community perceives itself as a 
target for victimisation, it might reinforce prevailing discourses of 
persecution, with consequences for peaceful co-existence in future.  
b. The second scenario is one in which one of the communities will attack 
others, but the attacks will be quickly managed through internal policing 
mechanisms. Elders will guide the community response, most probably by 
advising everybody to remain calm, ‘until an appropriate time’.11 
Furthermore, the government security forces will be alert and quickly 
neutralise any outbreak of violence. A show of force similar to that displayed 
during the referendum may deter an outbreak of violence.   
                                                 
10
 Interview with a victim who is also a peace worker in Eldoret, 16 September 2010 
11 FGD with a group of youth leaders, Eldoret, 15 September 2010 
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c. The third scenario is one in which communities will be preoccupied with 
local level power politics and react with ambivalence to ICC indictments of 
community leaders. Those indicted will find it difficult to mobilise ethnic 
constituencies for support. In particular, local preoccupation with the 
implementation of the New Constitution, particularly local level political 
power struggles within the County, could diminish the relevance of a 
‘community’ leader, hence limit the capacity to mobilise sustainable 
support.  
 
20. There is a need to pay attention on the middle and lower level perpetrators: Although 
the indictment of senior politicians may not trigger violence, there is need to address 
impunity by also prosecuting middle and lower level perpetrator. The focus on those 
who bear the greatest responsibility may fail to deter those who carried out the actual 
arson, killing, rape and other attacks because they may feel that they will not be held 
accountable. For instance, although investigators from the ICC had already visited the 
country in May with a view to holding those responsible for the post-election violence 
responsible, the spectre of indictments did not deter political supporters from engaging 
in local level conflicts during some of the by-elections in June 2010 and during the 
referendum campaigns in July 2010.12 
 
21. On the basis of the findings for this period, it can be concluded that lack of a collective 
position within the Government remains the most significant threat to the fight against 
impunity. If left unaddressed, new divisions over the ICC will hinder implementation of 
the new constitution. The various interests, some seeking to prevent the ICC 
investigation and others promoting the ICC cause, will turn the New Constitution into a 
theatre where to wage their wars. Significant also is that influential individuals are 
organising against the ICC using ethnic constituencies. This has the potential to 
distract attention from the pursuit of justice for victims and the need to fight impunity. 
Political commitment to support the ICC is critical at this stage.  
 
22. Politicising the ICC intervention will be of little effect. Only the Pre-Trial Chamber 
(PTC) can stop the ICC. The Pre-Trial Chamber can decide to terminate the case or 
send the prosecutor back to find more evidence. Kenyan politicians cannot stop the 
process.  
Illegal groups and security sector reforms 
23. Chapter 4 of the New Constitution provides for the Bill of Rights, which includes the 
right to assemble, picket, demonstrate and present petitions to public authorities. 
Article 34 under the Bill of Rights provides for the freedom of the media. The 
Constitution provides the freedom and independence of electronic, print and other 
types of media. However, it states that such freedom may not be abused to propagate 
war, incite violence and advocate for ethnic hatred and discrimination.13 
 
                                                 
12
 Although there has been no political violence so far, there were several instances where youth engaged in 
acts of violence during political campaigns. Left unpunished, the youth can easily engage in violence similar 
to the post-election period. see Police foil campaign clash, Daily Nation 7 June, 2010; Chopper stoned as 
‘Yes’ rivals face off, Daily Nation 25 July 2010 
13 Constitution of Kenya, Chapter Four 
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24. Ironically, on the date of the Promulgation of the New Constitution, the police arrested 
activists who were peacefully demonstrating against the Government’s decision to 
invite the Sudanese President, who has been indicted by the ICC. Human rights 
activists have also accused the Government of failing to uphold the Constitution by 
allowing the rendition of eight Kenyans to Uganda for investigations over bombings 
attributed to the Somali militia Al-Shabaab.14    
 
25. The last review report noted a reduction of violence, a situation attributed to the lull in 
activities of illegal groups and improved food security following the bumper harvest in 
the long rains season. The latest statistics from the Ministry of Internal Security show 
that overall, crime levels have gone down by 4 per cent. However, Nairobi province 
records the highest increase in crime, attributed to the influx of IDPs who have fled the 
Rift Valley for the city, where they have boosted the ranks of extortion gangs.15   
 
26. Illegal groups re-inventing themselves: The past four months saw a lull in the 
activities of known illegal groups ostensibly because some of their leaders were seeking 
to shed the negative image and present themselves as candidates for public office. 
However, the rise of macabre murders in Nairobi, Central and Nyanza (Kisii area) 
regions has raised concerns about the possible resurgence of illegally armed groups. 
The proliferation of extortion gangs particularly in urban low income areas has 
continued to pose a serious threat to security. Interviews in Nairobi reveal extortion 
gangs have taken control of the public transport industry, and a culture of impunity has 
emboldened them.  
 
27. Prevention of Organised Crimes Bill enacted: The government has enacted a new law 
to deal with organised crimes and criminal groups. The law provides for stiff penalties 
for involvement in organised crime. Interestingly, the coming into force of the law 
coincided with the resumption of a nation-wide ‘crackdown’ on the Mungiki, an illegal 
group. In the past, such measures, which often resulted in human rights violations 
including extra-judicial killings, were employed for lack of a policy guideline and 
strategy to deal with organised criminal gangs. The Organised Crime Act focuses on the 
criminal dimension of illegal groups but does not address the socio-economical and 
political problems that promote their existence. 
 
28. Need for urgency in undertaking institutional reforms: The re-invention of illegal 
groups, the return of macabre killings and the resurgence of extra-judicial killings 
point to the needy for urgency in reforming the police and other institutions. More 
than two years after the signing of the National Accord and Reconciliation agreement, 
is a sufficient period to determine that police and other institutional reforms have been 
too slow to have the desired impact. Going into another election without the required 
police reforms is highly inadvisable. The New Constitution alone cannot guarantee 
stability; only commitment to the spirit and letter of the new constitution can do this. 
To show the new will, radical police reforms must be speeded up. 
 
29. Introducing the legislation without reforming the police force, will not achieve the 
desired results. In fact, the need to reform the police force remains urgent, given the 
                                                 
14 Public forum on the kidnapping and rendition of Kenyans to Uganda, Nairobi, 24 September 2010 
15 Interview with a senior government official, 25 September 2010 
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prevalence of internal wrangles, allegations of involvement in crime and conflicts 
between different organs.16 The Police Reforms Implementation Committee that 
oversees actualisation of the recommendations of the Task Force on Police Reforms has 
drafted a number of legislation to anchor police reforms in law. These include the 
Independent Policing Oversight Authority Bill, which is intended to establish a police 
oversight body; the National Police Service Bill which merges the Kenya Police and the 
Administration Police; and the National Police Service Commission Bill, which will be 
responsible for the management of the police force.17 The provisions in these Bills are 
consistent with Chapter 14 of the Constitution. Passing the Bills and enforcing them 
should be considered a matter of urgency. 
The Referendum and the IDPs 
30. Previous reports indicated that by June 2010, a majority of Kenyans believed that 
violence would not recur and that ethnic relations were steadily improving. Many 
people also felt more secure than they did at the beginning of 2008. However, as the 
referendum approached, the re-emergence of leaflets and resurgence of hate speech 
seemed to reverse the gains made in peace and reconciliation. The use of inflammatory  
language by the same leaders who had preached peace a few months earlier suggested 
that the promotion of sustainable inter-ethnic cohesion requires more strategic 
thinking.  
 
31. Allegations of disproportionate assistance to IDPs from only one community intensify 
resentment and reinforce local perceptions of ethnic favouritism: As reported 
previously, there have been concerns that IDPs from those groups perceived as 
‘aggressors’ have not received adequate Government assistance. In particular, 
allegations of lack of systematic assistance to Kalenjin IDPs and others who lost 
property in the violence has bred deep resentment against Kikuyu IDPs, who are 
perceived to be favoured by the Government. Allegations that people from some ethnic 
communities were struck off the registers of ‘genuine’ IDPs dominate discourses of 
ethnic favouritism. For instance, a group of 92 households displaced from Subukia and 
now camping at Chepsion in Kipkelion claim that they have not been assisted while the 
‘Government favoured’ IDPs have been given land right to their camp.18   
 
32. Records from the Ministry of Special Programmes indicate that of the 6802 families 
identified to be allocated land, 789 families have already received plots allotments and 
relocated to their farms.19 As noted in previous reports, the allocation of land to IDPs 
who had already bought their own land created divisions within IDP groups, 
particularly those who had not yet received any funding.20  The records also indicate 
that only 13 tented camps are remaining, since nearly all IDPs have been ‘resettled’.  
However, the IDP Network indicates that there are more than 40 camps where IDPs 
unable to return to their former homes continue to live.  
                                                 
16 Local media showed several incidents of violent confrontations  
17 Speech by Prof. George Saitoti, Minister for Provincial Administration and Internal Security during the 
National Conference on Security Sector Reforms held on 20 -22 July 2010 
18 Interview with representatives from the camp in Kipkelion, 17 September 2010 
19 Ministry of Special Programmes, IDP Status Brief, 31 July 2010  
20 Interview with representative of IDPs in Nakuru, 4 August 2010 
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Table 1: Existing IDP camps 
District No. of Camps by 
source of data 
 
 Ministry IDP 
Network 
Name of Tented camps according to IDP Network 
Molo 11 9 Total, Casino, Mosque, Ragwenda, Githima (Kioo Farm), Karai, Kamwaura 
A, Keringet Centre, Matunda     
Uasin Gishu 2 11 Ya Mumbi, Naka, Kamuingi, Kambi Thomas, Geiti Farm, Rurigi, Kondoo 1-
9*, Nyakinyua, Ray Farm, Mafuta  
TransNzoia 0 3 Gatatha (Scheme Moto), Patwaka, GSU Salama 
Turkana 0 3 Kakuma, Kanamkamer, Nakwamekwi 
Kisii 0 1 Ekerenyo 
Nyandarua  0 7 Kianda, Kaibaga, Kasuku Oljororok, Uiumiririe, Ridpa, Dundori, Mawingu, 
Rongai 0 1 ALKO 
Naivasha 0 3 Kikopey, Longonot, Gilgil 
Kericho  0 2 Leru, Chepsion, 
Nyando 0 1 Muhoroni 
Total  13 41  
 
33. Differences in meanings associated with the term ‘resettlement’ explain the 
discrepancy in the numbers. According to Government practice, once IDPs in a 
particular camp have received the start up funds (Ksh. 10,000), the camp ceases to 
exist in records whether or not the IDPs leave the camp. Equating the term 
‘resettlement’ with access to Government funds, therefore, does not help in giving an 
accurate picture of IDPs in camps. It gives a false impression about the number and 
plight of IDPs. Furthermore, there is also a tendency by some IDPs to divert the 
‘resettlement’ funds to other usages while remaining in camps. There is need for an 
audit of the various categories, locations and circumstances of IDPs in Kenya in order 
to untangle the contested statistics and claims about the resettlement programme.  
 
34. The number of IDPs who have received government funds is also contentious, fanning 
increasing allegations of misappropriation and embezzlement. Discussions at the 
Protection Working Group on IDPs have raised concern about inconsistencies in the 
data some of which shows in the table below. These inconsistencies in data have fed 
into observations about misappropriation of IDP resettlement funds. 
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Table 2: Disbursed Start-up Funds (Ksh. 10,000) as of July 2010 
 Amount disbursed to IDPs (Ksh.10,000) 
Province  5 Oct 2009 31 July 2010 
Rift Valley 1,096,086,000 1,071,056,000 
Coast  8,250,000 11,580,000 
Eastern 3,264,000 3,264,000 
Central  47,950,000 101,030,000 
Nairobi 37,900,000 37,940,000 
Western 132,734,500 132,674,000 
Nyanza 162,248,000 188,788,000 
Total 1,488,432,500 1,509,392,00021 
Source: MoSSP, IDP Brief, 31 July 2010 
 
35. With regard to allegations of embezzlement, in 2009, the Kenya Human Rights 
Commission and the Kenya National Commission of Human Rights released separate 
reports highlighting cases of theft of about Ksh. 250 million by two government 
ministries, citing an audit report by the Auditor General.22 The Government promised 
to investigate alleged embezzlement, and the case was referred to the Kenya Anti-
Corruption Commission for further investigations. 
Conclusions 
36. The IDPs continue to suffer; their problems are far from over. The Government is a 
signatory to the 2006 Great Lakes Protocol on the Protection and Assistance to 
Internally Displaced Persons and the 2009 African Union Convention for the 
Protection of IDPs in Africa (Kampala Convention). These should serve as important 
instruments for a lasting solution to the IDP problem. The continued presence of IDPs 
in camps and other settings is indicative of a structural problem that needs a more 
effective policy and institutional response.  
  
37. Incoherence within the Grand Coalition Government over the ICC investigations 
continues to hinder ICC’s work. The emergent new divisions in Government seek to 
politicise the investigations process and will make it difficult for ICC to access objective 
information and data. The various cliques, some seeking to prevent the ICC 
investigation and others promoting the ICC cause, are aimed at protecting political 
interests. The ICC itself must be alert to the reality that impunity has re-organised and 
is fighting back. The ICC must be aware that these interests promoting impunity are 
also economically and politically powerful. They have the ability to mobilise ethnic 
constituencies in their support so as to frustrate the ICC’s work difficult. But this is not 
the time to give up; it is the time to act and with speed before the next General 
Elections. 
 
 
 
                                                 
21 The records obtained from the Ministry indicate the total disbursed by end of July to be sh. 1,428,320,000 
22 KNCHR Press release ‘Outcome of KCNCHR assessment of GOK resettlement program of IDPs and 
corruption allegations’ 2 Dec 2009; KHRC, Out in the Cold, December 2009 
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3. THE REFERENDUM AND THE NEW CONSTITUTION OF KENYA 
 
Introduction 
38. The parties to the mediation process and the Panel of Eminent African Personalities 
recognised that there were several long-standing issues that had caused the crisis and 
that these would still lead to recurrence of violence if unaddressed. Among these were 
constitutional and institutional reforms. The KNDR formulated Agenda Item 4 to guide 
implementation of reforms on these issues. 
 
39. This report examines the development of Kenya’s New Constitution because of its 
significance in opening an opportunity for far-reaching reforms including those in all 
Agenda Item 4 issues. The report recognises that issues under Agenda Item 4 are very 
important and would complement consolidation of the philosophy and values 
undergirding the New Constitution. Implementation of the police, civil service, judicial 
and parliamentary reforms, for instance, should proceed seamlessly even as the 
framework for implementing the New Constitution evolves. Institutional reforms 
should not be delayed. 
 
Key Findings 
• At 72 percent, the referendum voter turnout is the highest ever recorded turn out in 
Kenya’s electoral history 
• The Constitution received an overwhelming popular endorsement but the 30 per 
cent disapproval rate points to strong vested interests that will continue to linger on 
the horizon 
• The referendum was viewed as a low-stakes national event unlike personalised 
electoral contests 
• Heavy police presence and the looming shadow of the ICC deterred violence 
• The campaign by the National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC) 
against hate speech curtailed mobilisation for violence  
• The Interim Independent Electoral Commission’s handling of the voting and tallying 
process restored confidence in the electoral process    
• IDPs and ‘outsiders’ take pragmatic measures to avoid violence and its effects 
 
The historical significance of the New Constitution 
40. The passing of a New Constitution through a peaceful constitutional referendum in 
August 2010 marks a major positive milestone in Kenya’s political history. It is a 
culmination of years of protracted struggle that has defined the second phase of 
democratic consolidation after the reintroduction of multi-party democracy in 
November 1991. It represents the attainment of major structural reforms and, in this 
sense, complements the economic recovery and transition ushered in through the 
Economic Recovery Strategy for Employment and Wealth Creation (ERS) launched at 
the beginning of the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) government in 2003. It also 
complements policies around Vision 2030.  
 
41. It is indisputable that Kenya’s New Constitution enjoys wide popular support and 
legitimacy as evidenced by the huge number of people who turned up to vote (72 per 
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cent of all votes cast) and the number that approved it (67 percent). But what 
distinguishes the August 2010 referendum from past major political events is its 
popularity. At a 72 percent voter turnout, the 2010 referendum voter turnout is the 
highest recorded in the history of elections in Kenya. This alone is indicative of 
renewed confidence in the ballot and the vote itself after the post-2007 election 
violence that left a legacy of deep mistrust in electoral processes. Secondly, with the 67 
percent of the votes in favour, the New Constitution has passed an important 
legitimacy test. The referendum and the passing of the New Constitution, therefore, is 
of great historical significance to Kenya and even to Africa in general.  
 
42. The passage of the New Constitution marks the beginning of reforms on important 
issues that have remained unaddressed for a long while. Some of these issues informed 
the pattern of voting during the referendum and may even affect implementation of 
some of the articles of the New Constitution. This pattern of voting and its possible 
impact on implementation is discussed below. 
The Referendum Result: An Analysis 
43. An examination of the voting pattern during the referendum reveals that there is no 
clear linkage between people’s regional location and their voting behaviour with regard 
to the constitution. Constituencies in the same county and region would vote 
differently in spite of sharing similar experiences or local circumstances. But the vote 
on whether to approve a proposed constitution or not is different from a vote for a 
leader. The latter is about personal stakes for which people put their lives at risk. It is 
apparent that the constitution did not have such stakes. This would mean that 
nationhood is yet to mature – more people tend to vote for personal rather than 
national interests. Nevertheless, it is important to begin to pay attention to exactly why 
voters in some areas voted against the New Constitution. The 31 per cent No vote is 
sizable and also significant in terms of uncovering the strong interests that were 
threatened by the New Constitution. These cannot be ignored for they will continue to 
threaten effective implementation of the New Constitution.  
Figure 1: Referendum Result – Yes and No vote 
 
 
44. Rift Valley had the highest No vote: The majority of the No vote was in the Rift Valley 
(66 per cent) and several other areas that voted against the proposed constitution 
because they feared “local imperialism” – i.e. they feared domination by other groups 
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in the new Counties. 23 Lower Eastern Province also had a significant No vote – about 
43 percent. Although the Church’s opposition to the draft constitution influenced this 
outcome in these areas, it is certain that the ‘County question’ was one of the key 
factors influencing this pattern of voting. This implies that the County question will 
remain on the radar even as implementation sets off. This calls for strict adherence to 
Article 10 of the Constitution – National Values and Principles of Governance – in 
establishing County governments in order to ensure that they are inclusive and that 
they are anchored in the principles of equity, democracy and best practice.  
 
45. There is poor correlation between voter registration and voter-turn out: An 
examination of the relationship between percentage voter registration (VR) and voter 
turnout (VT) on a constituency and regional basis show interesting patterns and 
asymmetries. Areas that had high voter registration are not necessarily the same areas 
that had a high voter turn out. Voter turnout and voter registration were only at par in 
Nairobi, also traditionally the lowest voter turnout region in the previous elections. 
Voter turnout was higher than voter registration only in Nyanza and Central provinces. 
The biggest VT: VR ratio was witnessed in Coast and Western provinces. Turn out was 
lower than registration in these provinces, which may suggest that the Constitution did 
not sufficiently respond to the voter expectations that voters had at the time of 
registration as voters.24 It is also possible that they were complacent that the 
constitution will go through and therefore did not turn out to vote. 
Figure 2: Voter Registration and Voter Turn Out by Province 
Voter turn out distribution by 
province
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23 July 2010 National Poll, South Consulting. 
24 Coast, for example, has always desired a majimbo (federal) system of government which is a more radical 
form of devolution than the new constitution provides for. Western province also had reservations about the 
size and number of counties that some argued did not correspond with their numeric strength – a point more 
or less vindicated by the census  whose results were released after the referendum. 
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46. The number of rejected votes was high: The other notable point in the referendum 
results is that at 218, 633 (2 percent of voter turn out) the number of rejected or spoilt 
votes was rather high. Although as a statistic it appears small in value (2 percent), it 
has significant practical and political implications - the total number of spoilt votes is 
almost equivalent to the difference between the PNU and ODM presidential 
candidates’ results in the disputed 2007 presidential elections results. In percentage 
terms Rift Valley, Eastern and Nyanza had more rejected votes than other regions. 
Many constituencies had between 5 and 10 percent rejected votes. The probable 
explanations for this high number of rejected votes may have to do with confusing 
instructions on the use of symbols or marking the ballots. It may as well be attributable 
to insufficient voter education. This is one area that requires the attention of the IIEC 
in the transition period particularly given the likely complexity of ballots and logistics 
in the coming elections. There will be many positions to vote for compared to the past 
when people voted for only the President, MP and a civic leader. Voters will be making 
choices on many positions. The ballot and logistics will be complex. 
Figure 3: Rejected votes by province 
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47. The approval rating was generally strong in seven of the eight provinces. It was highest 
in North Eastern at 96 per cent and lowest in Rift Valley at 34 per cent. In four 
provinces the approval rating was over 80 per cent; in two it stood at over 70 per cent; 
and in one it registered 56 per cent. A regional and constituency assessment of the vote 
suggests that the steadiness or lack thereof of the political leadership may have 
influenced the strength of the vote either way. Regions whose political leadership 
exhibited low passion also registered low results. This observation also holds for areas 
that in the main eventually voted ‘Yes’.  
22  
  
 
Figure 4: Approval rating of the New Constitution by regions 
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NAIROBI REGION 
48. In Nairobi all the constituencies returned a strong Yes vote. Except for the largest 
constituency, Embakasi, the No vote in all the areas was less than 26 percent in all 
constituencies. Most of this was attributable to the Church whose strongest support 
base is among the urban poor. Langata had the highest number of rejected votes  (4 per 
cent), surpassing Embakasi which that has the highest number of voters. This may 
have resulted from misinterpretation of the voter guidelines as well as poor voter 
education. 
Table 3: Referendum results – Nairobi region 
Nairobi 
Constituency  Yes Yes [%) No No [%] Rejected 
votes 
Rejected 
votes[% 
Voter turn 
out  
Voter turn out 
[%] 
Makadara  62,636 72% 22,397 26% 1,802 1% 86,835 69% 
Kamukunji 64,211 73% 20,508 23% 2,938 2% 87,657 66% 
Starehe 68,815 70% 25,529 26% 4,612 3% 98,956 72% 
Langata 89,280 76% 22,653 19% 6,251 4% 118,184 73% 
Dagoretti 63,855 73% 21,119 24% 2,257 2% 87,231 71% 
Westlands 76,398 78% 18,540 19% 3,345 2% 98,283 71% 
Kasarani 104,214 77% 28,245 21% 2,596 1% 135,055 74% 
Embakasi 149,212 73% 49,204 24% 5,497 2% 203,913 69% 
COAST REGION 
49. All the 22 constituencies in Coast province returned a strong Yes verdict. In all but one 
constituency, over 70 percent of the voters approved the draft constitution. But Ganze 
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had the narrowest Yes win; about 31 percent rejected the draft. Even though the overall 
Yes margins were still large, 20 – 25 percent voters rejected the draft constitution in 10 
of the 22 constituencies. 
 
50. The strong Yes vote in this region may have been a result of the interplay of three 
issues: land, devolution and religion, particularly the Kadhis Court question25. The 
region has a historical land squatter problem which the Constitution, both in the land 
chapter and the Bill of Rights, promises to deal with. The region has also been the 
strongest advocate for the majimbo system of government. The region’s mainstream 
leadership rallied around the Constitution with the exception of one. The fear of 
dominance by the majority in the County probably contributed to this exception. 
Table 4: Referendum results – Coast Region 
Coast  
Constituency  Yes Yes [%] No No [%t] Rejected 
votes  
Rejected 
votes[%] 
Voter turn 
out  
Voter 
turn out 
[%] 
Changamwe 42,515 73% 13,658 24% 1,829 2% 58,002 63% 
Kisauni  54,494 75% 15,989 22% 2,206 2% 72,689 63% 
Likoni 22,710 80% 4,322 15% 1,242 2% 28,274 56% 
Mvita  32,820 80% 7,065 17% 1,093 2% 40,978 60% 
Msambweni 29,862 81% 5,882 16% 1,243 2% 36,987 54% 
Matuga 17,623 87% 2,522 12% 169 0% 20,314 49% 
Kinango 17,122 75% 4,965 22% 797 2% 22,884 45% 
Bahari 30,750 75% 8,751 21% 1,415 2% 40,916 49% 
Kaloleni 23,080 71% 8,242 25% 1,305 2% 32,627 48% 
Ganze 11,407 66% 5,455 31% 469 1% 17,331 50% 
Malindi 31,561 77% 8,808 21% 821 1% 41,190 58% 
Magarini 13,945 75% 4,096 22% 590 2% 18,631 52% 
Garsen 10,196 73% 3,552 25% 205 1% 13,953 50% 
Galole 7,609 75% 2,313 23% 167 1% 10,089 53% 
Bura 9,511 89% 1,025 10% 192 1% 10,728 48% 
Lamu East 2,615 95% 112 4% 15 0% 2,742 30% 
Lamu West 12,097 74% 3,748 23% 607 2% 16,452 57% 
Taveta 11,155 75% 3,046 21% 574 3% 14,775 69% 
Wundanyi 13,159 86% 1,731 11% 463 2% 15,353 60% 
Mwatate  15,541 84% 2,335 13% 541 2% 18,417 60% 
Voi 15,854 78% 3,915 19% 445 1% 20,214 62% 
Kinango 55,072 86% 7,767 12% 1,047 1% 63,886 80% 
 
 
                                                 
25 The issue of religion may need to be treated with a little more circumspection given that the constituencies 
where Islam is strongest – particularly Mombasa County – also returned significant NO votes. It may be that 
the pulling power of the landed gentry was strong. 
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NORTH EASTERN 
51. This region and all its Counties returned a very strong Yes vote that in percentage 
terms, was the highest in the country (96 per cent). This strong showing could be 
attributed to two factors: one, Kadhi’s Court, which enjoys universal support of the 
predominantly Muslim region in an area under-served by the formal judiciary and, 
two, the promise of devolution. Interestingly the region was one of the two 
constituencies country wide (Wajir North and Vihiga in Western) that had zero rejected 
votes. Generally the number of rejected votes in North Eastern province is negligible 
compared to other regions. 
Table 5: Referendum results – North Eastern Region 
North Eastern  
Constituency  Yes Yes [%] No No [%] Rejected 
votes  
Rejected 
votes[%] 
Voter 
turn 
out  
Voter turn 
out [%] 
Dujis 17,378 92% 1,337 7% 221 1% 18,936 57% 
Lagdera 7,751 97% 177 2% 73 1% 8,001 37% 
Fafi 3,475 97% 94 3% 10 0% 3,579 40% 
Ijara  6,066 95% 292 5% 28 0% 6,386 51% 
Wajir North 3,840 89% 472 11% 0 0% 4,312 43% 
Wajir West 10,755 98% 242 2% 6 0% 11,003 46% 
Wajir East 12,675 96% 541 4% 46 0% 13,262 56% 
Wajir South 7,047 94% 395 5% 48 1% 7,490 34% 
Mandera West 11,738 99% 77 1% 14 0% 11,829 65% 
Mandera Central 17,145 98% 303 2% 87 0% 17,535 60% 
Mandera East 13,122 92% 1,040 7% 66 0% 14,228 50% 
 
EASTERN 
52. Eastern province is ethnically heterogeneous, with central and lower parts heavily 
settled by the Meru, Embu and the Kamba. In the north are mainly the Gabra, Rendille, 
Somali, Samburu and Borana. While all the constituencies in the north returned a 
strong Yes vote, the other two parts of Eastern had a marginal Yes vote. In Lower 
Eastern, six constituencies returned a No vote.  Even in areas where Yes won, the 
margins for the most part were exceptionally thin. 
 
53. The voting pattern in Lower Eastern emerged from a combination of factors: one, 
indecisive leadership by the area leaders; two, the strong influence of the Church; and, 
three, misgivings about the low number of Counties measured against the population 
size. Lower Eastern had a tension between grievances over the County and a natural 
urge to support the Constitution because senior leaders such as the Vice President and 
senior Cabinet Ministers campaigned for it. Voter loyalty was also split between 
political and religious leadership. Again there is need to begin paying attention to 
issues especially around the County government so as to assuage the anxieties 
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expressed by the opponents of the Constitution in the area. 
Table 6: Referendum results – Eastern Region 
Eastern 
Constituency  Yes Yes [%] No No [%] Rejected 
votes  
Rejected 
votes[%] 
Voter turn 
out  
Voter turn 
out [%] 
Moyale 10,196 80% 2,518 20% 85 1% 12,799 42% 
North Horr 5,568 85% 951 15% 11 0% 6530 32% 
Saku 7,723 81% 1,823 19% 46 0% 9,592 59% 
Laisamis 6,800 73% 2,465 27% 30 0% 9295 47% 
Isiolo North  16,646 78% 4,398 21% 339 2% 21383 64% 
Isiolo South  6,668 94% 360 5% 75 1% 7103 60% 
Igembe South 20,635 36% 35,365 62% 1,276 2% 57276 75% 
Igembe North 15,603 34% 29,477 64% 875 2% 45955 75% 
Tigania West 20,464 66% 9,665 31% 1,018 3% 31147 70% 
Tigania East 24,667 65% 12,444 33% 806 2% 37917 75% 
North Imenti 51,598 73% 18,076 26% 1,121 2% 70795 68% 
Central Imenti 35,406 73% 11,497 24% 1,528 3% 48431 75% 
South Imenti 39,827 69% 17,418 30% 610 1% 57855 73% 
Nithi 49,515 67% 21,957 30% 2,408 3% 73880 71% 
Tharaka  14,627 47% 15,655 51% 680 2% 30962 68% 
Manyatta 27,548 52% 23,392 45% 1,594 3% 52534 69% 
Runyenjes 23,630 52% 18,086 40% 4,000 9% 45716 67% 
Gachoka 17,231 53% 14,341 44% 1,140 3% 32712 69% 
Siakago 9,330 40% 13,344 57% 862 4% 23536 69% 
Mwingi North 24,489 61% 14,780 37% 854 2% 40123 63% 
Mwingi South 22,372 59% 14,541 38% 965 3% 37878 63% 
Kitui West 14,283 41% 19,639 56% 944 3% 34866 63% 
Kitui Central 19,416 53% 16,201 44% 1,069 3% 36686 62% 
Mutito 14,201 58% 9,654 39% 606 2% 24461 66% 
Kitui South 13,488 48% 14,177 50% 620 2% 28285 60% 
Masinga 15,197 53% 13,356 46% 309 1% 28862 66% 
Yatta 18,342 58% 12,550 40% 831 3% 31723 63% 
Kangundo 26,568 49% 26,477 49% 834 2% 53879 62% 
Kathiani 31,243 52% 28,804 48% 52 0% 60099 64% 
Machakos Town 22,069 43% 27,654 54% 1,627 3% 51350 66% 
Mwala 19,489 48% 20,453 50% 694 2% 40636 63% 
Mbooni 20,554 45% 23,737 52% 941 2% 45232 69% 
Kilome 9,572 43% 12,315 55% 494 2% 22381 65% 
Kaiti 13,506 46% 15,465 53% 384 1% 29355 68% 
Makueni 28,340 51% 26,150 47% 834 2% 55324 67% 
Kibwezi 24,298 49% 22,924 47% 1,918 4% 49140 64% 
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CENTRAL 
54. Central province returned a strong Yes vote in all constituencies. The NO vote was 
stronger in greater Kiambu County partly because of the strong influence of the Church 
and partly as a product of indecisive leadership. Furthermore, influential leaders in 
many parts of the region belatedly decided to support approval of the constitution 
particularly after the President’s had held large campaign rallies in the country. It was 
not politically prudent, therefore, to go against the President’s desire to support 
approval of the draft. Nevertheless, it is notable that there are still some constituencies 
where the No vote was about 20 percent. 
Table 7: Referendum results – Central Region 
Central 
Constituency  Yes Yes [%] No No [%] Rejected 
votes  
Rejected 
votes[%] 
Voter turn 
out  
Voter turn 
out [%] 
Kipipiri 25,976 88% 3,074 10% 531 2% 29,581 78% 
Ol Kalou 60,036 92% 4,238 6% 1,127 2% 65,401 79% 
Ndaragwa 30,432 94% 1,780 5% 241 1% 32,453 82% 
Tetu 30,183 92% 2,232 7% 382 1% 32,797 81% 
Kieni 55,659 90% 5,085 8% 889 1% 61,633 79% 
Mathira 53,736 87% 7,158 12% 595 1% 61,489 81% 
Othaya 34,806 90% 3,039 8% 626 2% 38,471 80% 
Mukurweini 30,507 89% 3,148 9% 443 1% 34,098 80% 
Nyeri Town 42,288 85% 6,281 13% 1,274 3% 49,843 82% 
Mwea 45,385 79% 10,765 19% 1,334 2% 57,484 75% 
Gichugu  36,078 75% 11,655 24% 653 1% 48,386 75% 
Ndia 32,183 85% 5,554 15% 248 1% 37,985 78% 
Kirinyaga Central 34,995 80% 8,491 19% 489 1% 43,975 78% 
Kangema 26,924 9% 2,589 9% 429 1% 29,942 80% 
Mayhioya 30,411 91% 2,430 7% 489 1% 33,330 81% 
Kiharu 55,752 85% 8,386 13% 1,594 2% 65,732 79% 
Kigumo 38,060 85% 5,765 13% 923 2% 44,748 79% 
Maragwa 41,025 84% 6,319 13% 1,409 3% 48,753 77% 
Kandara 48,630 86% 6,278 11% 1,728 3% 56,636 80% 
Gatanga 48,655 85% 8,050 14% 750 1% 57,455 78% 
Gatundu South 32,422 75% 10,209 24% 541 1% 43,172 78% 
Gatundu North 30,290 79% 7,014 18% 1,211 3% 38,515 78% 
Juja 101,472 74% 33,589 24% 2,687 2% 137,748 74% 
Githunguri 45,542 78% 11,243 19% 1,244 2% 58,029 82% 
Kiambaa 63,799 75% 18,848 22% 2,031 2% 84,678 80% 
Kikuyu 71,490 78% 18,537 20% 1,884 2% 91,911 79% 
Limuru 39,127 80% 8,392 17% 1,392 3% 48,911 79% 
Lari 34,032 79% 7,672 18% 1,501 3% 43,205 80% 
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RIFT VALLEY 
55. Rift Valley province is highly cosmopolitan and its referendum vote results mixed. Of 
its 49 constituencies, 31 voted No and 18 voted YES. All the Kalenjin constituencies in 
the Kericho, Baringo, Eldoret and Nandi Counties voted overwhelmingly No. So did 
Pokot and Transmara. However, Samburu, Trans Nzoia, Laikipia, Nakuru, Narok, and 
Kajiado counties all voted Yes. But in some of these Counties the returns were split: for 
example, Kajiado Central voted No as did Narok South and Kuresoi in Nakuru County. 
Surprisingly, voter turnout was low in many constituencies in North Rift that voted 
Yes. This pattern of voting, nonetheless, reveals that Rift Valley did not have a bloc No 
vote. The vote was fragmented compared to the 2005 referendum and the 2002 general 
election when the Kalenjin, Masai, Turkana and Samburu voted as a block and in a 
similar pattern. 
 
56. Factors responsible for this pattern included political grievances, fear of the 
implications of land clauses particularly regarding land acquired through political 
patronage, and some influence of the Church. There may have been an overlay of 
ethnicity in this vote but many in these regions may have also seen the Constitution as 
a possible cure to their historical marginalisation. Important, however, is that the 
region stood distinctly, in isolation from the rest of the country.  
 
57. The fact that leaders from a single community would choose to vote against the 
constitution while other regions and communities approved it, could impede 
implementation if the factors responsible for the voting pattern are not identified and 
addressed in earnest. A point of caution: the voting behaviour could have arisen from 
issues extraneous to the constitution. Interviews with many respondents in the area 
point to political factionalism within ODM as the main factors responsible for this 
trend. 
Table 8: Referendum results – Rift Valley Region 
                                                                                     Rift Valley 
Constituency  Yes Yes 
[%] 
No No [%] Rejected 
votes  
Rejected 
votes[%] 
Voter 
turn out  
Voter 
turnout 
[%] 
Kacheliba 3,962 29% 9,324 69% 151 1% 13,437 62% 
Kapenguria 7,891 19% 31,970 79% 687 2% 40,548 81% 
Sigor 5,824 17% 28,363 81% 624 2% 34,811 81% 
Samburu West 18,142 61% 11,307 38% 418 1% 29,867 72% 
Samburu East 7,747 81% 1,685 18% 77 1% 9,509 63% 
Kwanza 28,190 64% 14,520 33% 1,171 3% 43,881 73% 
Saboti 53,915 70% 21,251 28% 1,731 2% 76,897 73% 
Cherangany 23,266 52% 16,577 37% 4,519 10% 44,362 79% 
Eldoret North 43,317 39% 65,007 58% 2,951 3% 111,275 82% 
Eldoret East 14,565 22% 50,667 76% 1,459 2% 66,691 84% 
Eldoret South  22,889 33% 41,161 60% 4,610 7% 68,660 82% 
Marakwet East 1,817 8% 20,008 91% 177 1% 22,002 92% 
Marakwet West 1,580 5% 28,484 93% 596 2% 30,660 89% 
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Keiyo North 1,528 6% 23,643 93% 349 1% 25,520 86% 
Keiyo South 2,443 7% 34,424 92% 615 2% 37,482 89% 
Mosop 2,611 5% 46,884 92% 1,546 3% 51,041 90% 
Aldai 7,130 16% 33,027 76% 3,401 8% 43,558 81% 
Emgwen 12,240 19% 48,869 77% 2,006 3% 63,115 86% 
Tinderet 9,624 17% 45,398 79% 2,711 5% 57,733 83% 
Baringo East 4,895 42% 6,681 57% 97 1% 11,673 70% 
Baringo North 1,323 4% 28,369 95% 310 1% 30,002 89% 
Baringo Central 6,734 14% 38,875 84% 850 2% 46,459 85% 
Mogotio 1,509 7% 19,273 91% 373 2% 21,155 91% 
Eldama Ravine 7,865 23% 25,021 74% 702 2% 33,588 85% 
Laikipia West 58,810 85% 9,020 13% 1,051 2% 68,881 82% 
Laikipia East 45,338 85% 5,869 11% 2,340 4% 53,547 77% 
Naivasha 91,197 85% 11,898 11% 4,578 4% 107,673 78% 
Nakuru Town 81,782 78% 19,018 18% 4,548 4% 105,348 76% 
Kuresoi 14,377 21% 54,832 79% 554 1% 69,763 89% 
Molo 71,825 77% 18,926 20% 2,103 2% 92,854 84% 
Rongai 24,182 52% 20,391 44% 1,878 4% 46,451 81% 
Subukia 55,425 89% 4,098 7% 2,965 5% 62,488 84% 
Kilgoris 15,231 26% 41,885 72% 855 1% 57,971 82% 
Narok North 35,355 70% 14,513 29% 900 2% 50,768 75% 
Narok South 22,690 36% 38,410 62% 1,096 2% 62,196 75% 
Kajiado North 61,926 68% 27,500 30% 2,018 2% 91,444 76% 
Kajiado Central 14,076 37% 23,461 62% 447 1% 37,984 78% 
Kajiado South 14,545 53% 12,682 46% 391 1% 27,618 72% 
Bomet 2,622 4% 65,870 95% 962 1% 69,454 90% 
Chepalungu 2,979 7% 42,169 92% 615 1% 45,763 89% 
Sotik 2,398 4% 54,045 95% 681 1% 57,124 90% 
Konoin 2,549 6% 42,368 93% 522 1% 45,439 89% 
Buret 1,774 3% 52,807 96% 594 1% 55,175 91% 
Belgut 4,760 7% 59,061 91% 1,048 2% 64,869 89% 
Ainamoi 7,809 14% 47,621 84% 1,104 2% 56,534 100% 
Kipkelion 9,530 15% 52,434 82% 1,729 3% 63,693 88% 
Turkana North 9,310 63% 5,459 37% 90 1% 14,859 36% 
Turkana Central 19,022 73% 7,097 27% 106 1% 26,225 54% 
Turkana South 10,812 73% 3880 26% 141 1% 14,833 57% 
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WESTERN 
58. Western province voted overwhelming in support for the Constitution. Only Mt Elgon 
delivered a No vote. But Mt Elgon has always been an outlier constituency given that it 
has stronger cultural similarities to the Kalenjin in Rift Valley than to the predominant 
groups in Western. This is the same with the three Rift Valley constituencies of 
Kwanza, Saboti, and to a lesser extent Cheranganyi – all of which voted for the 
Constitution as Western province, albeit with much smaller margins than the rest of 
Western. The Mt Elgon vote was also informed by the County question and the fear of 
domination by numerically larger groups in Western. 
Table 9: Referendum results – Western Region 
Western 
Constituency Yes Yes 
[%] 
No No 
[%] 
Rejected 
votes 
Rejected votes 
[%] 
Voter turn 
out  
Voter turn out 
[%] 
Voter 
turn out  
Malava 33,232 85% 5,120 13% 859 2% 61841 39,211 63% 
Lugari 52,835 83% 8,810 14% 2,017 3% 93853 63,662 68% 
Mumias 39,615 89% 4,043 9% 713 2% 66422 44,371 67% 
Matungu 25,622 89% 2,472 9% 608 2% 41668 28,702 69% 
Lurambi 49,234 85% 7,301 13% 1,579 3% 96057 58,114 60% 
Shinyalu 24,984 88% 2,636 9% 733 3% 57420 28,353 49% 
Ikolomani 22,469 92% 1,637 7% 430 2% 35833 24,536 68% 
Butere 28,018 90% 1,954 6% 1,051 3% 48162 31,023 64% 
Khwisero 20,783 92% 1,415 6% 453 2% 35192 22,651 64% 
Emuhaya 35,922 90% 3,052 8% 1,092 3% 66482 40,066 60% 
Sabatia 28,809 91% 1,900 6% 1,013 3% 47949 31,722 66% 
Vihiga 19,326 93% 1,374 7% 0 0% 34012 20,700 61% 
Hamisi 25,382 86% 2,432 8% 1,823 6% 52211 29,637 57% 
Mt. Elgon 12,766 31% 27,682 67% 976 2% 51845 41,424 80% 
Kimilili 43,695 80% 8,281 15% 2,773 5% 81562 54,749 67% 
Webuye 36,764 80% 8,048 17% 1,259 3% 67510 46,071 68% 
Sirisia 34,560 78% 7,893 18% 1,727 4% 67176 44,180 66% 
Kanduyi 30,376 71% 11,683 27% 964 2% 68148 43,023 63% 
Bumula 23,255 76% 5,826 19% 1,550 5% 51600 30,631 59% 
Amagoro 42,543 80% 9,553 18% 1,101 2% 77823 53,197 68% 
Nambale 33,859 84% 5,734 14% 728 2% 61096 40,321 66% 
Butula 22,774 91% 1,739 7% 597 2% 37435 25,110 67% 
Funyula 16,694 86% 2,302 12% 315 2% 32250 19,311 60% 
Budalangi 12,397 84% 2,185 15% 111 1% 22909 14,693 64% 
NYANZA 
59. All the constituencies in Nyanza, except Kuria, voted in favour of the New Constitution. 
However, there was a significant No vote in Kisii Nyanza compared to the Luo-
dominated constituencies, where approval rating was above 95 percent of the vote. An 
interesting outcome in Luo-dominated Nyanza is the voter turn out in all 
constituencies where it was generally above 80 percent and two constituencies 
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recorded about 90 percent voter turn out. The number of rejected votes was generally 
low in the area. In Kisii-dominated areas of Nyanza, however, voter turn out was under 
64 percent generally except one with 73 percent. Two other constituencies had about 
50 percent. 
Table 10: Referendum results – Nyanza Region 
                                                                                               Nyanza 
Constituency Yes Yes [as 
percentage of 
voter turn out] 
No No [as 
percentage of 
voter turn out] 
Rejected 
votes 
Rejected votes 
[as percentage 
of voter turn 
out] 
Voter 
turn out  
Voter turnout 
[as percentage 
of Registered 
voters] 
Ugenya 49,788 97% 642 1% 891 2% 51,321 80% 
Alego 49,155 97% 535 1% 986 2% 50,676 81% 
Gem 38,892 97% 552 1% 506 1% 39,950 79% 
Bondo 40,580 98% 375 1% 349 1% 41,304 83% 
Rarieda 35,206 98% 429 1% 244 1% 35,879 80% 
Kisumu Town East 45,294 95% 1,189 2% 1,293 3% 47,776 81% 
Kisumu Town West 68,699 95% 2,780 4% 717 1% 72,196 79% 
Kisumu Rural 39,024 98% 489 1% 305 1% 39,818 82% 
Nyando 38,009 98% 282 1% 317 1% 38,608 84% 
Muhoroni 37,434 96% 1,203 3% 209 1% 38,846 83% 
Nyakach 35,805 99% 276 1% 242 1% 36,323 82% 
Kasipul-Kabondo 54,015 98% 330 1% 770 1% 55,115 89% 
Karachuonyo 44,408 98% 205 0% 507 1% 45,120 87% 
Rangwe 50,701 98% 547 1% 292 1% 51,540 86% 
Ndhiwa 42,478 99% 240 1% 277 1% 42,995 88% 
Rongo 51,634 97% 530 1% 880 2% 53,044 87% 
Migori 48,677 99% 478 1% 242 0% 49,397 89% 
Uriri 28,977 98% 294 1% 228 1% 29,499 84% 
Nyatike 37,805 99% 255 1% 201 1% 38,261 89% 
Mbita 26,230 98% 310 1% 156 1% 26,696 84% 
Gwassi 23,673 98% 254 1% 164 1% 24,091 83% 
Kuria 16,486 42% 21,717 56% 836 2% 39,039 71% 
Bonchari 17,039 70% 6,761 28% 648 3% 24,448 73% 
South Mugirango 15,658 75% 4,928 24% 237 1% 20,823 50% 
Bomachoge 26,018 77% 7,187 21% 481 1% 33,686 51% 
Bobasi 28,182 74% 7,840 21% 2,144 6% 38,166 63% 
Nyaribari Masaba 22,076 83% 3,718 14% 684 3% 26,478 62% 
Nyaribari Chache 23,109 72% 8,004 25% 1,127 3% 32,240 66% 
Kitutu Chache 30,891 68% 13,253 29% 1,200 3% 45,344 63% 
Kitutu Masaba 37,301 84% 6,202 14% 1,068 2% 44,571 64% 
West Mugirango 29,815 86% 4,195 12% 689 2% 34,699 63% 
North Mugirango 
Borabu 
40,974 86% 5,491 11% 1,367 3% 47,832 63% 
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The Referendum: Free and Peaceful 
60. The Referendum on the New Constitution was conducted peacefully: After several 
months of lively campaigns on the Proposed New Constitution, Kenyans went for a 
national referendum on 4 August 2010. The voting and tallying process started and 
ended peacefully in all parts of the country. The peaceful referendum was lauded 
locally and internationally as a crucial step in the consolidation of democratic 
institutions and the rule of law. It was a statement on the Coalition Government’s 
capacity to deliver on needed reforms.26 Having a peaceful referendum two years after 
the post-election violence and concluding a constitutional review process after about 
two decades of failed attempts are significant achievements. Some have termed this as 
the most important achievement since independence itself in 1963.’27 
 
61. Peaceful referendum reduced anxiety: The days preceding the referendum were filled 
with anxiety as Kenyans expressed fear of post-referendum chaos in the fashion of the 
2007 post-election violence. Peace-building NGOs mapped potential hotspots of 
violence and identified early-warning signs. Among these were the  resurgence of hate 
speech, and circulation of literature warning certain communities to leave some areas 
particularly in the Rift Valley.28 However, there was no violence reported during the 
period.  
Factors behind the peaceful referendum 
62. Several factors, combined, led to a peaceful referendum. There were political, 
institutional or structural, and ethnicity-related factors. Amongst these were also ICC-
related factors that may be considered. 
 
Political factors 
 
63. The alliance between PNU and ODM solidified support: First, the main political 
parties, PNU and ODM, generally allied in support of the constitution. All the major 
ethno-political groups, except sections of the Rift Valley, mobilised in support of the 
Constitution. Although ODM remained factionalised, the main block within the party 
allied with PNU to support approval of the New Constitution. This prevented 
organisation of a major political opposition against the proposed Constitution as was 
the case in the referendum held in November 2005.  
 
64. Opposition against the Constitution was organised along new lines and not the 
traditional ones that cause violent conflicts: Secondly, the Church emerged as a strong 
opposition against the Constitution. Opposition to the Constitution therefore did not 
coalesce along the traditional ethnic and political party lines, which in the past resulted 
in violent conflicts. Generally, the opposition by the Church, given its national spread, 
weakened the basis for ethno-political mobilisation, which would have contributed to 
violence.  But field interviews also show that, in addition to the above, there are other 
significant dynamics that eroded the basis for violent conflicts including in the areas 
                                                 
26 UNOCHA-Kenya, Humanitarian Update  Special Edition –Constitutional Referendum,  11 Aug 2010 
27 Remarks by the US Ambassador to Kenya at a forum on Civil Society and the Implementation of the New 
Constitution, Nairobi, 23 September 2010, p.1 
28‘Ancestral lands, injustices are real issues’ Daily Nation, 29 August 2010;‘Cohesion team issues violence alert 
over referendum’ Daily Nation, 25 July 2010  
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where political violence usually occurs. Some of these are discussed here. 
 
65. Political and religious leaders unified in support of a peaceful referendum: Both the 
national political leadership and religious leaders collectively called for a peaceful 
referendum. In spite of divisions between opponents and supporters of the proposed 
New Constitution, leaders called for a peaceful referendum. Moreover, the political 
alliance between the President and the Prime Minister, both representing different 
political parties in the Grand Coalition, brought together groups previously opposed to 
one another. The alliance brought together major ethnic and political groupings 
thereby reducing the ethno-political acrimony that usually characterises national 
political competition. Furthermore, political and religious leaders opposed to the 
Constitution called on Kenyans to be peaceful regardless of the outcome of the 
referendum.29 
 
66. The referendum was a low-stakes national contest and it was not essentially about 
the personal quest for political survival. The referendum was viewed as a low-stakes 
issue for a number of reasons. Firstly, unlike the general elections, which determine the 
political future of individual politicians, the referendum was not about personal stakes. 
Some of the respondents interviewed noted that the outcome of the referendum could 
not affect the immediate political careers of politicians: ‘It was not a matter of life and 
death… politicians did not campaign with passion because no one was going to lose 
an elected post or seat whether or not the people approved the Proposed 
Constitution.30 Secondly, the ordinary people did not relate the outcome of the 
referendum to tangible and direct benefits at the local level. There was a feeling that 
‘there is nothing to fight for; this thing is not for my tribe.’31 Because of this sense of 
abstraction and lack of ownership, people viewed the contest around the New 
Constitution as something external to them.32  
 
Institutional and structural factors 
 
67. The NCIC’s campaign against hate speech halted mobilisation for violence: From 
June 2010, the National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC) warned against 
perpetuating of hate speeches. The Commission summoned senior politicians over hate 
speech and demanded their arrest.33 The arrest of a few politicians over allegations of 
propagating hate speech-making during the early period of the referendum campaigns 
forced politicians becoming more cautious. Gradually the referendum campaign 
became issues based; politicians could not mobilise protests and demonstrations as 
expected. On the whole, the NCIC sustained a campaign for a peaceful referendum 
particularly through monitoring the campaigns.34  
 
68. The public confidence in the Interim Independent Electoral Commission (IIEC) 
legitimised the results. People praised the IIEC for transparent management of several 
                                                 
29 Catholic Information Service for Africa, ‘Catholic Bishops Statement on the Constitution’ 20 Aug, 2010  
30 Interview with a teacher in Rongai Constituency, 3 Aug 2010 
31 Interview with an area chief in Kipkelion Constituency, 6Aug, 2010 
32 Interview with a human rights activist in Nairobi, 23 July 2010 
33 Kenya Human Rights Commission, ‘The Good, the bad and the ugly: Kenya’s match to the referendum’ 30 
July 2010 
34 Presentation by NCIC at the National Protection Working Group meeting at KNCHR offices, 27 July 2010 
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by-elections held before the 4 August 2010 referendum. Public confidence in the IIEC 
and the electoral process legitimised the results. This made it difficult to employ 
discourses of rigging, which could have led to violence. Further, all parties accepted the 
referendum results. Those opposed to the Constitution conceded defeat and urged 
supporters to maintain peace and participate in the implementation of the New 
Constitution. Leaders who supported approval of  the New Constitution also urged for 
inclusiveness in the implementation process, despite nascent intra-party divisions and 
civil society debate over whether or not to include No supporters in the implementation 
structures. 
 
69. Deployment of security officers deterred violence. A few days before the referendum, 
the Government deployed thousands of security officers drawn from the Regular 
Police, General Service Unit, Administration Police, the Kenya Wildlife Service and 
Kenya Prisons Service to areas mapped as possible scenes of violence. The Rift Valley 
province was ‘inundated with security’.35 Although some have argued that this created 
an environment of safety, allowing them to vote freely without fear of attack, there are 
those who frowned upon the ‘unprecedented show of overbearing security officers’ at 
the local level. To some, the security forces ‘came armed for war, not to provide 
security’.36 The fear that the enhanced security had orders to ‘deal firmly’ with any 
incidents of unrest obscured local discourses of possible violence and deterred attacks 
because ‘nobody wanted to die’.37 Memories of police shootings during the post-
election violence and the absence of police reforms also raised questions about security 
officers’ ability to manage possible riots. ‘They have not gone through new training. 
It’s the same drill; why would you expect them to act differently this time?’38 
 
Ethnicity- related considerations 
 
70. Rift Valley leaders were keen not to be associated with political violence. It is 
significant that there were those who observed that the deployment of security officers 
was meant to protect certain communities especially in the Rift Valley Province, the 
epicentre of the post-2007 political violence.39 They observed that police presence was 
higher in the Rift Valley than elsewhere in the country. Local leaders were concerned 
about the area being associated with violence and possible isolation by other 
communities. Local leaders sought to address this by urging for a peaceful referendum: 
‘we had to demystify the mindset of Kenyans about this community, we were not going 
to enact the stereotype’.40   
 
71. In areas affected by the post-election violence, voters registered in separate polling 
stations, minimizing interaction on polling day. In cosmopolitan regions notably in 
Uasin Gishu, people from different communities registered in different polling stations 
and in particular polling stations where their own ethnic group formed the majority. 
One IDP for instance noted that ‘as a minority, we didn’t want to risk being caught up 
                                                 
35 Interview with a community elder in Eldoret, 16 Sept 2010 
36 Ibid 
37 FGD with some youth leaders in Eldoret, 15 Sept 2010  
38 Interview with a senior government official, 25 Sept 2010  
39 Interview with a group of young men in Mauche shortly after the Referendum, 5Aug 2010 
40 Interview with a community leader, Eldoret 16 Sept 2010 
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in violence if it broke out at the polling station. We also wanted them to know there 
are those among them who voted Yes. If we voted there, they would have said all YES 
were Kikuyu votes; now they know.’ The Kalenjin also registered to vote away from 
Kikuyu dominated polling stations. This deliberate segregation, though not widespread 
across the Rift Valley, was a manifestation of lingering lack of trust between the 
communities.  
 
72. Some voters in the post-election violence flashpoint preferred not to practice their 
democratic rights so as to prevent violence: This lack of trust between various 
communities in PEV areas resulted in people having difficulties in freely and openly 
taking part in the referendum. Those in No strongholds who were supportive of the 
New Constitution could not freely support the New Constitution.41 The opposite is true 
of those who live in Yes strongholds; they could not afford to be openly associated with 
the No team . 42 This is a legacy of the 2007 PEV, when those who supported the rival 
political opinion were isolated as ‘the enemy within’ and attacked. People in these areas 
did not debate the referendum openly for fear of reprisal.43  
 
73. Some IDPs moved out of flashpoints of violence but returned after the peaceful 
referendum: the campaign for and against the proposed New Constitution initially 
created anxiety in post-election violence hotspots. IDPs who felt unsure of their 
security moved their families and moveable assets temporally out of the flashpoints. 
For instance, some Kikuyu families moved away from some parts of Mauche area of 
Central Rift Valley, while a sizeable number of Luo families left Uasin Gishu. Thus even 
if violence had occurred, not many people would have been affected. 
 
74. Lessons learned from the 2007 post-election violence minimised willingness to be 
recruited into an agenda of violence: Kenyans regret the 2007 post-election violence 
because everyone felt the consequences of the violence, whether they were victims or 
perpetrators.  Interviewees observed that Kenyans had learnt that violence does not 
pay. In the Rift Valley, elites realised that the local economy has suffered significantly 
because traders and consumers of goods and services migrated out of the area. This 
general awareness informed a public determination to shun violence. For instance, 
when a grass-thatched house belonging to a returning IDP was set on fire in Kuresoi a 
day before the referendum, the public cooperated with the police in looking for and 
arresting the suspected arsonists.44 In Burnt Forest, the murder of two young men, 
from two different communities a day after the referendum created tension but did not 
spark violence. Elders from both communities met and resolved that ‘it is clear 
someone was trying to instigate violence, but we refused to be used.’45  
 
75. Spectre of indictment by the International Criminal Court deterred mobilisation for 
violence: The looming shadow of the ICC was felt throughout the referendum 
campaigns. Respondents observed that politicians were worried about the chance of 
                                                 
41 Interview with a former Member of Parliament,   
42 Interviews in Kisumu, 14 Aug 2010 
43 Interview with official of the Provincial Administration, Bomet, 6 Aug 2010 
44 Interview with a representative of IDPs, 6 Aug 2010; see also OCHA Kenya, Constitutional Referendum 
Update, 5 Aug 2010 
45 FGD with members of a peace project based in Burnt Forest, 15 Aug 2010 
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another ‘secret envelope’ with names of perpetrators of post-referendum chaos. 
Leaders were less willing to associate themselves with violent causes. This pattern of 
behaviour suggests the need to strengthen measures and institutions mandated to fight 
impunity for political violence. 
Conclusion 
76. The voting pattern in all regions and constituencies demonstrates that it was not one 
factor that motivated approval or rejection of the New Constitution. There were 
regional and other specific issues that shaped the way people voted. It is these issues 
that must be distilled out during implementation of the Constitution in order to 
assuage opposition, no matter how limited, against the New Constitution. The fact that 
constituencies in the same region would vote differently, with some voting 
overwhelmingly in favour and others overwhelmingly against the Constitution raises a 
need to carefully identify the underlying currents that shaped this pattern. 
 
77. Interviews with different respondents in various regions as well as the survey carried 
out in July before the 4 August 2010 referendum revealed that concern about 
devolution is one of the many issues at the centre of this pattern. To some, devolution, 
as provided for in the New Constitution, is an important achievement for them as a 
collective. But there are others who are afraid that numerically larger groups, ethnic or 
sub-ethnic or even clans, would dominate them if they were to be in the same County. 
Their No vote, therefore, symbolised their rejection of domination by these numerically 
larger groups. 
 
78. The process of implementing the Constitution should not lose sight of these new 
tensions between groups in the same County. The fears may be genuine if Kenya’s 
political culture does not change to embrace the national values and principles of 
governance spelt out in Article 10 and Chapter Six of the New Constitution. 
Establishing County governments should, therefore, be based on the principles of 
inclusion, transparency and accountability. A change of political culture from being 
patronage-based politics to one of public service and accountability must be underlined 
as critical requisites for the successful renewal of Kenya. 
 
79. Was there a correlation between ethnicity and voting choices? Was the jinx of Kenya’s 
electoral politics broken? The approval vote itself was very strong. But it was not 
devoid of the usual jinx, ethnicity. Approval was delivered in most regions through 
brokerage of regional ethnic leaders. Even where the No vote was strong, the regional 
or ethnic leaders were, directly or indirectly, at the centre of this result. Again only by 
implementing the New Constitution in a manner that does not respect the status quo 
will people begin to realise that change has occurred. Circumventing the spirit of the 
New Constitution will promote the status quo and bring about unintended conflicts 
once again. 
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4. THE NEW CONSTITUTION AND IMPLICATIONS FOR GOVERNANCE 
AND POLITICS  
 
80. Literature on how to promote political stability in deeply fragmented societies has 
settled on an institutional tool kit for such societies including those fragmented along 
ethnic lines such as Kenya: this involves a parliamentary system of government; Mixed 
Member Proportional Representation (MMPR); devolution and the  special protection 
of minorities. Kenya has cherry-picked from this list to create a strong presidential 
system but with an elaborate system of checks and balances. It is nonetheless 
encouraging that an attempt to limit excessive presidential powers was made.  
81. This section of the report discusses how the New Constitution will impact on 
governance and politics in Kenya. The discussion also identifies what may be critical 
challenges to implementation. Suggestions on key interventions are also made. 
The New Constitution and governance 
82. The electoral system is not altered; it could be a source of tensions in the future: The 
New Constitution has not altered Kenya’s electoral system. It has retained the ‘first-
past-the-post’ electoral system and largely ignored MMPR. It has also privileged 
delineation of constituencies on the basis of population as the dominant criteria. The 
main challenge here is that the ‘majoritarian system’ promotes a ‘winner-take-all’ 
approach to political power. This approach often produces violent conflicts because 
those who lose represent communal interests. Delineation of boundaries on the basis of 
population size will create additional tensions when constituency boundaries are being 
drawn. Further, it is possible that communities that are geographically dispersed, even 
if they are not numerically large in absolute terms, will enjoy stronger parliamentary 
presence both in the National and the Senate. If appointment to various commissions 
and offices are pegged to parliamentary seats then they will reflect this form of 
representation. 
83. Devolution is the fulcrum around which major political conflicts and issues will 
revolve: Devolution is one of the issues that raised support for and opposition to the 
Constitution. The public perception of how successful the New Constitution is will be 
made on the basis of how well devolution is effected. Indeed, devolution is what speaks 
most concretely to the general public in terms of what represents real change in their 
lives. However, its implementation will face several challenges. Because of its 
significance, it is expected that there will be multiple interpretations of several articles 
that are not definitive in meaning. Among these is Article 203 on what ‘equitably 
distribute’ the 15 per cent revenue is; two is the design and the operation of the 
provincial administration and local authorities alongside the counties; and finally there 
is the capacity gap in the counties in terms of technical abilities as well as quality of 
political elite. The Commission for the Implementation of the Constitution (CIC) as 
well as the Constitutional Implementation Oversight Committee (CIOC) will be 
required to identify and address these issues in earnest before they undermine effective 
operationalisation of what many people consider the most important aspect of the New 
Constitution, devolution. 
84. The New Constitution is focusing on resource sharing and not power sharing: 
Whereas the dispersal of power has been achieved through creation of a variety of 
institutions, the Constitution has elected to move away from power sharing to resource 
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sharing. Rather than developing an approach to ‘inclusive government’ in order to 
address the political problem of group marginalisation, the constitution has 
approached the problem from a resource perspective. The search for a more united and 
cohesive Kenya has clearly taken a resource rather than a political dimension. The 
implications for the country in this respect are enormous as new institutions have to be 
created to help advance the economic and political agenda to enable the realisation of 
unity and cohesion. This approach to the problem of political marginalisation will 
incite new demands from the people and will require the government to be accountable 
and responsive in the exercise of power. Striking the right balance between demand 
and supply is not going to be easy. Unfortunately, public expectations are high. Only by 
committing to the values of the New Constitution and breaking from the past will these 
expectations be addressed. Failure break from the past by demonstrating a new way of 
doing things will frustrate and disillusion the public 
85. Volume of work for governance institutions will increase rapidly: The Bill of Rights, 
the provision for direct public petition to the legislature, enforcement of Chapter Six on 
Leadership and Integrity, and the independent commissions, for example, are going to 
generate a considerable volume of work for governance institutions.  The loosening of 
the requirement for locus standi on rights questions; provision for public interest 
litigation; expansion of the Bill of Rights to include economic and social rights; easing 
of procedures in accessing the courts and conduct will see an upsurge in the demand 
for justice. This raises the need to urgently pay attention to rapid expansion of the 
operational capacity of the judiciary and to speedy automation of judicial proceedings. 
This on its own requires that judicial reforms be speeded up lest implementation of the 
Constitution meets an unprepared institution. There would be a judicial crisis if this 
were to happen. 
86. Building capacity of existing institution is critical: New institutions must be created 
and existing ones given capacities to deliver on their new or revised mandates. There is 
a new Senate, new Supreme Court, new independent commissions, new County 
Governments and Assemblies, new security organs to establish – and within a fairly 
tight  timeframe. For both new and existing institutions of government there must be a 
demonstration of ability and capacity to process inputs from the public. This will 
certainly generate tension as the ‘supply institutions’ may neither possess nor be 
capable of immediately acquiring the necessary internal capacity to process these 
demands. Beyond capacity, many may not have the attitude that would respond to this 
New Constitutional reality that privileges service to the public. 
87. The New Constitution embraces best international practice; this will create new and 
distinct demands: Philosophically, the New Constitution embraces international best 
practice and its articles embed norms and principles in international law. As a 
consequence, it imposes on Kenya the obligation to honour and abide by its 
international commitments, which have now been recognised as being a source of 
Kenyan laws. This is going to raise new demands. Institutions need to be prepared for 
this eventuality. 
88. Vision 2030 should be aligned with the provisions of the New Constitution: The 
delivery of a New Constitution was one of the activities contained in the Vision 2030. 
The Constitution is now the Supreme Law and therefore it is important to now align 
Vision 2030 with the provisions of the Constitution. There may not be significant 
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points of divergences on issues such as values – which are fairly congruent in the two 
documents – people-centeredness, equity, democracy, and inclusivity. However, the 
institutional framework for the economy and politics has changed. The creation of 
County governments that possess fiscal, legislative and executive powers and 
responsibilities will require some significant revisions in Vision 2030. On the whole, 
however, the New Constitution provides a good institutional and structural platform 
for the implementation of Vision 2030. An alignment of these two will enable both 
political and economic transformation. 
Conclusion 
89. Kenya’s New Constitution has significant implications for governance and politics. 
Although it is a product of negotiation between self-interested political elites, it has the 
potential to alter the practice of politics and governance itself. The Constitution 
espouses a progressive philosophy of governance that has far reaching implications.  
90. The New Constitution has the potential to address political instability in Kenya. It has 
established a context for addressing political instability by especially promoting 
devolution and respect for minorities. The philosophy of sharing resources among 
Kenyans is itself an innovative approach to problems of marginalisation. However, the 
electoral system has remained unaltered. There may be need to revisit the debate on 
the best cure of representation problems in Kenya. 
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5. THE CHALLENGES OF IMPLEMENTING THE NEW CONSTITUTION  
 
Introduction 
91. The passage of the New Constitution in the 4 August 2010 Referendum, its eventual 
promulgation and the declaration of Kenya’s ‘Second Republic’ on 27 August is, no 
doubt, the most significant development in the country since independence.  Not 
surprisingly, the optimism of the Kenyan people about their lives and nation’s future 
has hit an all-time high. However, after the referendum, Kenya grapples with the twin 
challenges of reconciliation and implementing the New Constitution. Maintaining the 
bipartisan spirit, national consensus and momentum created by the referendum to 
ensure effective implementation of the New Constitution is currently the challenge 
facing Kenya’s political leaders, especially the two main political formations — Party of 
National Unity (PNU) and the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM). 
 
Cohesion challenges during the implementation process 
92. Divisions in the Coalition Government: The constitution provides for the 
establishment of the Commission for the Implementation of the Constitution (CIC) and 
the Constitutional Implementation Oversight Committee of the Parliament as the 
organs to steer the transition. However, lack of cohesion within the Coalition appears 
to constrain establishment of these important organs. Nevertheless, the Cabinet 
formed technical committees to help draft Bills before the two organs come into effect. 
The formation of such committees before the CIC becomes operational has been 
criticised as an attempt to hijack the implementation process, a view reinforced by 
claims that wider consultations are lacking before drafting and publishing of Bills.46  
93. Lack of ownership. It is interesting that sometimes the Cabinet is agreed to certain 
positions but fails to whip MPs or party members to adopt these positions. This 
suggests absence of a determined and committed leadership on the issue of 
implementation of the constitution. The absence of implementation institutions and 
apparent leadership vacuum has led to a situation in which different leaders make 
contradictory statements on how some provisions of the Constitution will be 
implemented.  
94. Lack of bi-partisan consensus and cohesion: A key challenge for the Coalition in the 
short term is how to sustain the national consensus and momentum that led to a 
successful referendum.47 The two principles have made personal efforts and appealed 
for unity in the transition period. But the Coalition Government lacks a functional 
dispute resolution mechanism to mediate emerging concerns about legal and 
institutional arrangements to manage in the transition period. The open disagreements 
by Cabinet members do not augur well for a cohesive, effective government. There is 
need to establish such a mechanism because unresolved differences will spill over into 
decision-making committees and hinder expedition of tasks outlined in the 
implementation schedules. Implementation of the New Constitution requires 
continued consensus within the coalition, consultation and participation of key 
stakeholders in the run-up to 2012.  
95. Factionalism within the main political parties: In the post-referendum period, both 
                                                 
46 Interview with a civil society key informant, 23 September 2010 
47 Interview with a PNU official, 7 September 2010 
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PNU and ODM parties are facing internal divisions over how to deal with members 
who campaigned against the New Constitution. Some members have called for party 
disciplinary action or dismissal from the Cabinet. However, affected MPs have vowed 
to fight back.48  Lack of inter and intra-political party cohesion might spill into 
parliament and affect the bi-partisan consensus needed to pass bills that anchor the 
New Constitution. The deadlines for passage of these new laws are tight. Parliament 
cannot meet these deadlines if there is no bi-partisan consensus. Internal conflicts 
within the parties as well as inter-party conflicts will clearly make it difficult for 
Parliament to meet this challenge. Thus, Parliament needs unity of purpose devoid of 
the intrigues arising from political brinkmanship.49 Fundamentally, Parliament has a 
Leader of Government Business, a position that the House itself did not fill for two 
years owing to conflicts between the two parties. It is now expected that passing the 
new bills required to anchor the constitution will speed up. 
96. Anti-reformers can sabotage the process: Previous reports have observed that anti-
reformers have regrouped and formed political and bureaucratic alliances to frustrate 
the reform process. In the run up to the referendum, they buttressed the numbers of 
the undecided (colloquially referred to as ‘water melons’ to denote people who were 
green for Yes, and red for No). Because of the passion with which such groups protect 
self-interests, it is possible that they will use the bureaucracy and their political 
influence to develop legislation of a low standard or ensure that proposed legislation 
protects the status quo.50 This of course calls for vigilance.  Anti-reform forces 
including the ‘water melons’ may  take over the implementation of the Constitution. If 
they do, the old order will prevail, and the country will revert from a reform mode to 
‘business as usual’.  
97. The water melons and non-reformers are very much in place: The old order is still 
entrenched, even if they supported the Constitution. Those who lacked passion for the 
New Constitution and the so called ‘water melons’ occupy strategic decision-making 
positions and control enormous resources. Their capacity for mischief is limitless 
especially in the absence of a strong political bulwark both from the top and below. 
Again public vigilance is crucial to stem the influence they may have in how 
implementation will proceed.  
98. Meeting the high public expectations: The overwhelming support for the constitution 
was due to the hope by Kenyans that it marked the beginning of a new era of 
accountability and delivery of services.51To many, it heralds a better life and future 
through creation of employment opportunities, improved security and better access to 
basic services. Strategies for managing these expectations, particularly in the short 
term, will sustain or reduce public support for the Constitution implementation 
process. In this regard, some argue that there is need for the government to produce 
quick wins so that immediate impact is visible to the citizenry even before its 
substantive effects are felt.52 However, it is not only the high expectations that need to 
be managed; there are cynical Kenyans who do not expect anything from the New 
Constitution. The government also needs to bring such people on board to realise the 
                                                 
48 Interview with a former NO secretariat official, 23 August 2010 
49 Remarks by a COE official at a public forum, 24 August 2010  
50 Interview with a former MP, 6 September 2010 
51 Proceedings from focus group discussions in Nakuru, Mauche and Eldoret South, held in September 2010 
52 Interview with a policy analyst, 1 September 2010 
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dividends of the New Constitution.53 There needs to be adequate consultation and 
citizen participation to sustain support for the process. In this regard, continuous civic 
education on the constitution is important.54  
99. Comprehensive civic education and public communication are key to fostering 
understanding of the provisions of the new constitution and to managing 
expectations. The referendum did not provide an adequate opportunity to learn the 
complexity and significance of the new constitution in terms of political, social and 
economic governance of the country.  The complexity of the new constitution implies 
that both government and civil society organisations need to provide civic education. 
Civil society organisations need to create awareness about what the public should be 
demanding of the government, and the government needs to create awareness within 
its structures and organs about what the new constitution demands of it and what to 
supply to citizens. This demand and supply type of civic education places responsibility 
on both the government and civil society organisations to carry out civic education, 
which will give meaning to the letter and spirit of the new constitution.  
100. There is need for a national public forum to debate what type of civic education is 
required and who should be providing it. Civic education was not been embedded in 
the new constitution. To better understand its provisions and expedite its 
implementation, there is an urgent need to begin to think of how to institutionalise 
civic education at all levels, including embedding it in the school curriculum.  
101. The political culture and absence of constitutionalism are a key threat: The New 
Constitution is progressive on many fronts but it still faces the risk of a-yet-to-be-
changed political culture. This is the argument long made by a leading Kenyan 
constitutional scholar who observed that Africa’s main governance problem is less 
about the existence of a good constitutional structure than the absence of the culture of 
constitutionalism – the habit of respecting and observing rules.55 Kenya’s longstanding 
political culture of impunity and unaccountability will take a while to erode, even 
though the new law will certainly provide incentives to begin to reverse it. The 
resilience of the old political culture may be strengthened by the fact that the 
enactment of a New Constitution has not simultaneously corresponded with the 
emergence of a new political and bureaucratic elite. For instance, the Judiciary, which 
would have provided a possible cure to this problem, is yet to be reformed.   
102. Political ownership is weak because elites lost out: Political elites lost out in many 
ways because self-interest did not enable them to effectively compromise. This fact 
poses a significant challenge to the implementation of the Constitution: it weakens 
political ownership at the top while raising expectations from below. This in itself will 
generate tensions of delivery and performance. In other words, the New Constitution 
lacks a strong political constituency, particularly within the political elite. All sections 
of the political elite ‘lost’ something significant in the negotiations, which has 
weakened rather than tightened the ownership. While a good number of the so-called 
150 amendments proposed in the House before the referendum might have been  
frivolous, many still betrayed bitterness over the ‘loss’ of privileges that were significant 
for members and the political elite. Grieving over these losses continues and increases 
                                                 
53 Remarks by a civil society leader during a public forum, 2 September 2010 
54 Interview with an elder, 14 September 2010 
55 See H. W. O. Okoth-Ogendo, Constitutions without Constitutionalism in Africa 
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the incentives to frustrate implementation. Public vigilance over the political elites is 
critical in this respect. This demands that civil society and the private sector pull 
themselves up to put pressure on the elites to respect by the new rules. 
103. A heavy legislative agenda with tight deadlines is ambitious: The New Constitution 
has several laws that need drafting and passing. There is a heavy legislative agenda not 
just in terms of new legislation that has to be enacted to operationalise various 
provisions, but also with respect to amendments to existing statutes to ensure that they 
remain constitutional. However, parliamentary speed in passing new laws may not 
match this demand. Unless the current parliament prioritises the passing of new laws, 
then it will be difficult to finalise the legislative agenda on time.  
 
Operational challenges 
104. The New Constitution will also face a number of operational challenges or difficulties. 
One of these will be the establishment of the county governments and their 
relationship with the provincial administration and local authorities. This process of 
design will face the stiff opposition and challenge from vested interests.  It will also be 
the theatre of struggle between the national and county governments. 
105. The second operational challenge has to do with the capacity deficit in various 
institutions, both new and old. In Parliament, for example, confirmatory hearings will 
be a challenge not only because of their newness but also because of the high number of 
hearings – now estimated at about 300.  
106. Parliament will also have to learn to generate its own Bills.  The legislative drafting 
support usually offered by the office of the Attorney General no longer exists and yet 
Parliament has not built the capacity for generating bills. For the County governments 
the challenges will be similar and worse particularly with respect to drafting legislation 
that is not only technically competent but also constitutional. The Supreme Court faces 
the challenge of interpreting a pure presidential system constitution with a stronger 
Westminster tradition and influence. The Executive itself has to learn a new art of 
practicing politics where power is shared with other arms, Counties and independent 
Constitutional Commissions. Trying to find the right balance will be difficult during the 
initial stages of implementation of the constitution. 
 
Conclusion  
107. Build political consensus: Political consensus is vital for a smooth implementation 
process. It is important for the government to engage in building bi-partisan consensus 
and alliances for the passage of key Bills in parliament. Regular joint parliamentary 
group meetings for the coalition partners are one way of building the consensus and 
buy-in. The window for passing parliamentary bills might close by December 2011 and 
the campaigns begin in earnest. With an uncertain future in national politics, there is 
little to bind politicians to the principals. Those who opt for county seats will then shift 
their focus to their respective counties. Thus it is vital for most of the Bills to have been 
passed by then, especially those with a bearing on the 2012 elections. 
108. Need for religious tolerance: During the referendum campaigns, the country 
experienced was confronted by religious intolerance. Thus, it is important for the 
Government, Church and civil society to engage in efforts towards building religious 
tolerance amongst the people.  
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109. Effective public participation: Most people did not vote on the provisions in the 
Constitution but according to the stand taken by their leaders. It is vital for sustained 
civic education to be conducted to help the electorate understand the Constitution and 
play their part in implementation. Kenyans can only own the process if they 
understand the constitution and counter the misinformation that was spread during 
the referendum. The government and civil society also need to develop structures for 
popular participation of the people. 
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SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
110. This report is about two issues that have gained prominence throughout 2010: the ICC 
intervention in the Kenyan situation; and development of a New Constitution of Kenya.   
The various sections of this report have highlighted the importance of a number of 
issues around these two themes. One, the findings reveal a need to concentrate on 
ending impunity with regard to the post-2007 election violence. The discussion has 
noted that punishing the perpetrators of post-election violence will go some way to 
providing justice to victims and, at the same time, lay the foundation of a process to 
change Kenya’s political culture. The ICC intervention is an important entry point in 
this respect.  
111. Two, the findings have shown the importance of Kenya’s New Constitution. The report 
suggests that the New Constitution will open a window of opportunity for far-reaching 
reforms including speeding up the Agenda 4 reforms on which the window shut when 
the process of delivering a New Constitution gained momentum. 
112. This section of the report reiterates some of the findings and conclusions. The 
discussion also makes suggestions on how to deepen reform in light of the New 
Constitution. 
 
The ICC and the Post-Election Violence 
113. The ICC investigation of the Kenyan situation has begun in earnest. This is important 
in one respect. It will impact on Kenya’s political culture of tolerating and celebrating 
impunity especially when senior and influential politicians are involved. In spite of the 
post-election violence, Kenya’s political culture has not changed. There are very clear 
signs that it is ‘business as usual’. Some senior politicians appear to lack commitment 
to the ICC intervention or are seeking to politicise it to promote their self-political 
interests. In other words, impunity has re-organised and it is fighting back at all levels. 
The clearest sign of this re-organisation is attempted mobilisation of ethnic 
constituencies against the ICC investigation. While this is happening, leaders appear to 
pay scant attention to the problem of IDPs many of who have remained without secure 
livelihood for more than two years.  
114. Divisions within the Grand Coalition Government have begun to show yet again. This 
is preventing development of a collective position on how to support the ICC 
intervention. On the whole, there is no clear leadership on how to deal with the post-
election violence and support the ICC investigation of the Kenyan situation. 
Pronouncements by some influential politicians appear to suggest that that they are 
keen to protect their political interests by delaying or avoiding the investigation 
process. Limited attention is paid to pursuing justice for thousands of victims and IDPs 
who suffered during the post-election violence. 
115. All communities should be aware of the fact that one of their own could be indicted 
and tried for the post-election violence. They should accept that the ICC is not 
targeting a community. And everybody will be required to recognise the fact that 
communities as a group do not commit crimes. Nor do they pay criminals to perpetrate 
violence. Individual politicians and other influential people have been behind the post-
election violence. And because they have never been put on trial, impunity has thrived 
and continued to threaten the life of the very communities they claim to represent. The 
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ICC is an avenue for justice for many people who suffered during the post-election 
violence.  
116. This development suggests a need for the Government in its entirety to commit itself to 
cooperate with the ICC. Some people within Government, including senior and 
influential officials, may be subject to investigation. It is such people who could be 
solidifying an ethnic agenda by insisting that the ICC is targeting communities. In the 
spirit of cooperating with the ICC, the government must let such people go if the ICC 
indicts them. Politicising the ICC intervention will not stop the ICC from 
investigations. Only the Pre-Trial Court (PTC) can stop the ICC. The Pre-Trial Court 
can decide to terminate the case or send the prosecutor back to find more evidence. 
Kenyan politicians cannot stop the process. 
 
Implementation of the New Constitution 
117. The passing of a New Constitution and in a peaceful referendum marks a major 
turning point in Kenya’s history. It is commendable that a process that had taken 
decades without completion, was finalised within a period of about two years from the 
time the Committee of Experts was appointed to start the process. The New 
Constitution enjoys wide popular support and legitimacy. The voter turnout itself was 
unprecedented; at 72 percent, the referendum turnout is the highest in Kenya’s multi-
party electoral history. And at 67 percent approval rating, the constitution is highly 
legitimate. This is important in one significant way: renewed confidence in the ballot 
after the post-election violence. The New Constitution, therefore, is of monumental 
historical significance to Kenya and even to Africa in general. 
118. The New Constitution has given Kenyans a sense of optimism and opened 
opportunities for far-reaching reforms. It has rightly raised public expectations on 
possibilities of a new culture of governance. However, the process of delivering it 
presents certain challenges. Some of these challenges issue from the factors that 
shaped the regional and constituency voting patterns. Other challenges stem from grey 
areas that were left unattended to during the negotiations among the elites at different 
points. These areas will become an arena of more political contest in future. 
119. The endorsement and promulgation of the New Constitution should not mask the fact 
that it faced considerable opposition from some key groups and influential actors in 
the Kenyan society. One should also not gloss over the fact that there were many 
undecided ‘water melons’ or influential leaders who did not want to endorse the New 
Constitution but nonetheless pretended to do so. The support of others was secured 
through political coercion. These will likely to cause hiccups throughout the 
implementation process.  
120. Devolution prompted more No votes outside Rift Valley than other issues. Some of 
those who voted No feared domination by minorities in the new Counties. They wanted 
their own Counties. This is an issue the implementation process must acknowledge and 
recognise as central to creating the new Kenya. To assuage the fears of the numerically 
small groups in the Counties, legislation on County governments must underline the 
principle of ‘inclusive government’ and ensure that all groups are adequately 
represented. The laws governing their operations must also seek to protect the 
minorities. Article 10 on ‘National Values and Principles of Governance’ as well as 
Chapter 6 on Leadership and Integrity should be established as the cornerstones posts 
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for the County governments.     
 
Conclusions 
121. These findings suggest that the New Constitution has set up a new framework; it is 
aiming at composing a new Kenya complete with new institutions and new values. 
Rights and freedoms are the cornerstone of this new Kenya. It is demolishing old 
institutions that were based on the colonial order. There is also an attempt to shield the 
new institutions from political patronage. There is renewed sense of optimism and 
hope – the constitution has created opportunities for recovery. 
122. The challenges facing creation of a new Kenya, however, are many. The new society is 
yet to show; the old habits have not died. The political culture is yet to change; the 
culture of bad governance is deeply embedded in all institutions and sectors but there 
is little debate on how to end it. The trend is to promote self-interest rather than the 
public good. Secondly, there is no public dialogue on what this new society is about and 
how it should be achieved. Thirdly, there is resistance to change by those who stand to 
lose in the event of its delivery. They opposed the Constitution because of personal 
interests rather than an ideological reasons. Some will continue opposing the 
Constitution and resisting it as long as it threatens the status quo and their chances of 
benefiting from bad governance. Fourthly, expectations are high. Some are unrealistic 
and yet they must be addressed. The public will be disillusioned once they see the 
culture of ‘business-as-usual’ slipping back in. 
123. There are several ways to mitigate against some of these challenges. One, policies and 
legislation around the New Constitution must draw from extensive consultations. The 
legislation must set high standards; the benchmarks must be so high that even those 
wishing to bring the standards down will find it difficult to do so.  Two, policy dialogue 
or debates must begin. And this is not the work of the government alone. This is the 
responsibility of all actors and in particular civil society, the private sector and the 
media. The hard task has begun and people must make decisions from an informed 
point of view. Three, the religious intolerance witnessed during the referendum must 
be addressed. These religious divisions have not disappeared with the conclusion of the 
referendum. These can be addressed only by promoting a clear understanding of the 
principles around which the Constitution is built: the principles of an open society.  
124. Institutional and electoral reforms must be undertaken and completed with urgency. 
Another election is due less than two years from now. The high number of rejected 
votes (spoilt votes) in the referendum is enough evidence of the need to undertake 
comprehensive voter education.  The Interim Independent Electoral Commission must 
also contend with the fact that the amount of investment required in order to deliver a 
free and fair poll at in the next general election.  Establishing the electoral body in line 
with the requirements of the New Constitution must begin in earnest for the system to 
be prepared for these reforms.    
 
 
